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# 1AC

## Interps

I affirm[[1]](#footnote-1)

1. Presume aff- environmental protection is presumed intrinsically valuable because it’s a good accessible to everyone, whereas resource extraction benefits the few. This provides a substantive reason to presume, which precedes theoretical reasons because there’s a degree of offense left in the round.

**2.** Prefer reasonable aff interp and drop the argument on T only. This also means the judge should use reasonability paradigm on theory with a bright line of in round structural abuse or the presence of link and impact turn ground for the negative for evaluating 1NC theory against AC interps and practices- that means all I have to do to answer his theory is prove as long as he can engage in the same practice, that means there’s no abuse because structural access to the ballot is the same or as long as he can turn the AC, it’s fair.

**A.** There are multiple legitimate interpretations of the topic and the aff goes into the round blind. I had to choose between mutually exclusive interps and the neg can always read T so don’t punish me for having to set grounds.

**B**. Increases topical clash by avoiding unnecessary theory; I am open to accepting neg interps provided they are reasonable and solves abuse on spec because I’ll clarify in CX.

**C.** . If the impact of T is to reject all aff offense and not just advocacy, affirm if I win a counter interp, or prove no abuse because the neg has arbitrarily overclaimed the implication of drop the argument to make it impossible to affirm. Reject the arg on T means I should have a free pass to sever my advocacy and start over in the 1AR because it’s true impact is to restart the debate under his interp- denying me all aff offense is the same thing as drop the debater because he says all my offense goes away and I can’t sever and generate new offense on the NC.

**D.** I can’t read T on the neg and the NC is reactive, so he can always pick a strategy that adapts to meet my AC and give him a shot at winning the round.

**3.** Interps:

A. I advocate the resolution as a general principle in all countries. SEC[[2]](#footnote-2) defines resource extraction:

To determine whether it meets **the definition of “resource extraction issuer**,” an issuer **must consider whether it is engaged in the commercial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals.** “Commercial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals” is **defined to include the activities of exploration, extraction, processing, and export, or the acquisition of a license for any such activity**. The adopting release provides additional guidance regarding the activities. The definition of “commercial development” is intended to capture only activities that are directly related to the commercial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals. It is not intended to capture activities that are ancillary or preparatory to commercial development.

B. I don’t generate offense on specific scenarios but I will clarify solvency mechanisms for the negative. Black’s Law Dictionary[[3]](#footnote-3) clarifies the scope of the aff advocacy: **Environmental** [**guardianship**](http://thelawdictionary.org/guardianship/) **based on policies** and procedures Objectives are (1) the **conserving of** [**natural resources**](http://thelawdictionary.org/natural-resources/), (2) **the preserving of the existing** [**natural environment**](http://thelawdictionary.org/natural-environment/) **and**, (3) where possible, **repairing damage and reversing trends**

This also means the resolution is a question of comparing policies, not aims or justifications for actions.

C. Oxford Dictionary[[4]](#footnote-4) defines should: **used to indicate obligation**, duty, or correctness, typically when criticizing someone's actions: *he should have been careful* | *I think we should trust our people more* | *you shouldn't have gone*.

So I value morality.

## Framework

Morality by very nature is a guide to action, it has to provide a normative structure that generates prohibitions or obligations on action for individual agents or else it would be meaningless. **The standard is rule consequentialism.** Prefer the standard – Actor Specificity- key to text the resolution questions what developing countries should do, so use rule consequentialism because it determines what maximizes expected wellbeing for society. Collective action results in tradeoffs and conflicts that only rule consequentialism can resolve. Woller[[5]](#footnote-5) ’97: Moreover, virtually all public policies entail some redistribution of economic or political resources, such that one group's gains must come at another group's ex- pense. Consequently, public **policies in a democracy must be justified to the public**, and especially to those who pay the costs of those policies. Such **[but] justification cannot** simply **be assumed** a priori **by** invoking some higher-order **moral principle.** Appeals to a priori moral principles, such as environmental preservation, also often fail to acknowledge that **p**ublic policies inevitably entail trade-offsamong competing values. Thus **since policymakers cannot justify inherent value conflicts to the public** in any philosophical sense, **and** since public policies inherently imply winners and losers, the policymakers' duty [is] to the public interest requires them to demonstrate that the redistributive effects and value trade-offs implied by their polices are somehow to the overall advantage of society. At the same time, **deontologically based** ethical **systems have severe practical limitations** as a basis for public policy. At best,[Also,] **a priori moral principles** provide only general guidance to ethical dilemmas in public affairs and do not themselves suggest appropriate public policies, and at worst, they **create a regimen of regulatory unreasonableness while failing to adequately address the problem** or actually making it worse.

Impacts:

A. No links indicts of the standard- policymakers act in cases of uncertainty without full knowledge of every consequence or implication in the universe but are always obligated to act since desirability and pain and pleasure are irrelevant

B. Preempts is/ought fallacy and empirical constraints- generally speaking countries should and do act to promote overall wellbeing and constraints only exist because a pattern of consistency maximizes well being overall- defense proves my framework is more probable

C. Deontological standards are false- ethical principles derived from the nature of pure reason generate broad stroke guidelines that fail to account for complexities in public policies and experience based factors that alter normative conclusions

D. I coopt constitutivist appeals to the nature of agency- I change the focus from individuals to the collective body of rational willers- to be a state just is to maximize utility. Thus reject autonomy freedom constraints because they paralyze state action- it’s impossible to weigh tradeoffs inherent to decisions involving opportunity costs and some constraint will always be violated.

Underview:

1. We all believe that we ought morally make the world better when we can—the burden of proof is on them to show otherwise. Thus, winning reasons to reject their standard is sufficient reason to default to the AC even if I do not win proactive reason to prefer mine. Sinott Armstrong[[6]](#footnote-6)

Even if consequentialists can accommodate or explain away common moral intuitions, that might seem only to answer objections without yet giving any positive reason to accept consequentialism. However, most **people begin with the presumption that we morally ought to make the world better** when we can. **The question** then **is only whether** any moral **constraints or** moral **options need to be added to the basic consequentialist factor in moral reasoning.** (Kagan 1989, 1998) **If no objection reveals any need for anything beyond consequences, then consequences alone** seem to **determine what is morally right or wrong**, just as consequentialists claim.

Also warrants the framework- revisionary intuitionism implies consequentialism.

2. Consequentialism has the most explanatory coherence overall- it distinguishes between a criterion of right action and decision procedure for agents every day lives. Sinnott-Armstrong[[7]](#footnote-7) 2

Instead, most **consequentialists claim** that overall **utility is the criterion**or standard**of** **what** is morally right or morally **ought to be done**. Their theories are intended to spell out the necessary and sufficient conditions for an act to be morally right, regardless of whether the agent can tell in advance whether those conditions are met. **Just** **as** **the laws of physics govern golf ball flight**, but **golfers need not calculate physical forces while planning shots**; so **overall utility can determine which decisions are morally right**, **even if** **agents need not calculate utilities while making decisions**. If the principle of utility is used as a criterion of the right rather than as a decision procedure, then classical utilitarianism does not require that anyone know the total consequences of anything before making a decision.Furthermore, **a utilitarian criterion** of right **implies** that **it** **would** **not** **be** morally **right** **to** **use** the principle of **utility as** **a decision procedure** in cases **where it would not maximize utility to try to calculate** utilities **before acting**. Utilitarians regularly argue that most people in most circumstances ought not to try to calculate utilities, because they are too likely to make serious miscalculations that will lead them to perform actions that reduce utility. It is even possible to hold that most agents usually ought to follow their moral intuitions, because these intuitions evolved to lead us to perform acts that maximize utility, at least in likely circumstances (Hare 1981, 46–47). Some utilitarians (Sidgwick 1907, 489–90) suggest that a utilitarian decision procedure may be adopted as an esoteric morality by an elite group that is better at calculating utilities, but utilitarians can, instead, hold that nobody should use the principle of utility as a decision procedure.This move is supposed to make consequentialism self-refuting, according to some opponents. However, **there is nothing incoherent about** proposing **a decision procedure** that is **separate from one's criterion of the right**. Similar distinctions apply in other normative realms. **The criterion of a good stock investment is its total return, but the best decision procedur**e still **might be to reduce risk by buying an index fund** or blue-chip stocks. Criteria can, thus, be self-effacing without being self-refuting (Parfit 1984, chs. 1 and 4).Others object that this move takes the force out of consequentialism, because it leads agents to ignore consequentialism when they make real decisions. However, a criterion of the right can be useful at a higher level by helping us choose among available decision procedures and refine our decision procedures as circumstances change and we gain more experience and knowledge. Hence, most consequentialists do not mind giving up consequentialism as a direct decision procedure as long as consequences remain the criterion of rightness (but see Chappell 2001).

Also means defense must indict the conceptual possibility of the standard, not problems with it’s instantiation.

## Contention 1: Conflict

Resource extraction causes violent intra and international armed conflict. Downey et al[[8]](#footnote-8) ‘10

However, nations and societies are not monolithic entities, and **regardless of whether a government willingly or unwillingly engages in** specific **resource extraction activities**, whether these activities are organized by local or foreign companies, or whether they occur in developed or developing nations or in nations with strong or weak legal and property rights regimes, it is likely that in many cases **individuals and groups will protest**, resist, **or rebel against these activities**. For example**, protestors might be worried about** local **environmental degradation** or health problems that result from resource extraction activities, they might be aggrieved by any loss of livelihood that they and their community may experience as a result of these activities, or they may be forced to relocate in order to make way for resource extraction (Structural Adjustment Participatory Review International Network, 2004). Similarly, workers hired by resource extraction firms may protest poor working conditions, local residents may receive few of the benefits but all of the burdens associated with resource extraction activities, or local residents may be indigenous, colonized, or otherwise marginalized people who resent government and outsider intrusion into their lives (Evans et al., 2002; Gedicks, 2001; Moody, 2007). In such instances, local and national **governments**, resource extraction **firms**, or rebels **who control natural resources** may **feel** that **they have no choice** **but to use violence** or the threat of violence **to protect** their **resource extraction** activities. Violent actions and threats of violence might include the forced relocation of local residents; the use of police, military, or mercenary forces to break up protests, arrest protestors and provide mine security; and the repression of local indigenous people from whose ranks protestors have emerged or might emerge. **Violent actions** might also **include military conflict** with groups that threaten resource extraction activities and foreign military aid and training to local police and military forces. Of course, armed violence may occur even in the absence of protest. For example, forced labor may be used to decrease labor costs or because working conditions are horrendous, and forced removal may occur in the absence of protest to either forestall protest or because there is no way to extract resources with people living on or near the extraction site. In either case, violence or threatened violence will likely be necessary because most people do not want to be forced to work or leave their homes.**The use** or threatened use **of violence** **to gain** or maintain **access to** vital **raw materials** may also occur in situations in which a resource that is viewed as being critical to national survival and economic prosperity, **such as oil or water**, is located in an area controlled by others in which mechanisms such as trade liberalization or structural adjustment have not effectively guaranteed permanent supplies of or control over the resource (see Klare, 2001, 2004, for detailed discussions of this type of situation). In such cases, **governments** might **resort to** actions such **as militarily enforced trade sanctions**, counterterrorism activities, **proxy wars**, military threats, **invasion**, or providing military aid and training to local police and military forces. Finally, because land and water transport is potentially subject to piracy or military disruption, governments may devote military resources toward protecting specific resource shipments (such as U.S. protection of Kuwaiti shipping during the Iraq–Iran war in the 1980s) or providing security for roads, railroads, and naval shipping lanes (Klare, 2001, 2004).5

Prefer this evidence:

A. Accounts for institutional mechanisms that underlie violence and nontraditional categories- also employs a theoretical model to uniquely prove causality. Downey et al 2

Nevertheless, relatively **few** ecological unequal exchange **researchers have thought** systematically **about** the organizational and **institutional mechanisms that underlie** ecological unequal exchange; and they and other environmental sociologists have paid only limited attention to **the role that armed violenc**e and militarism **play in** degrading the environment and **securing** core nation **access to** developing nation **natural resources** (Hooks & Smith, 2004, 2005; Jorgenson & Clark, 2009). Moreover, environmental sociologists and ecological unequal exchange **researchers** who have examined armed violence and militarism **tend to ignore** several important categories of armed violence and militarism, including armed **conflict between state and nonstate actors**, violent **repression** carried out by state and rebel forces, **and** the **use of mercenaries** to protect natural resource assets.**To** begin **[fill]** filling **these gaps** in the literature**, this article develops a theoretical argument** that holds that armed violence is one of several overlapping and mutually reinforcing mechanisms that provide core nations and corporations with the means to control or gain disproportionate access to the natural resource wealth of developing nations, thereby promoting capital accumulation and military power in the core; degrading local, regional, and global environments; and creating the conditions within which ecological unequal exchange can occur.

B. Neg studies focus on international institutions that contribute to violence, but exclude the necessary means to that violence. Downey et al 3

One set of institutions that facilitate resource extraction activities are **international trade and finance institutions** such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and World Trade Organization (WTO). These highly coercive institutions have multiple, often violent, negative impacts on individuals, societies, and the environment (Bello et al., 1999; Wallach & Woodall, 2004).1 However, these institutions **do not directly** use or **control the means of violence**, which we argue also play a critical role in maintaining and increasing global natural resource extraction and ensuring the safe transport of raw materials and finished products. **The means of violence are**, instead, **controlled by military, police, mercenary, and rebel forces** around the world that are usually, but not always, **associated with** local or national **governments** and that sometimes act on their own behalf and sometimes to ensure capital accumulation. Thus, we conclude that environmental sociologists and ecological unequal exchange **researchers should focus** theoretical and **empirical attention** not only on the relationship between natural resource extraction, raw material transport, armed violence, and environmental degradation but also **on the structural role that military, police, mercenary, and rebel forces play in harming the environment**.

C. Combines empirical and case studies- three reasons to prefer. Downey et al 4

Of course, there would be no point in doing this if resource extraction activities were rarely associated with armed violence. Thus, in addition to developing our theoretical argument, **we** also **demonstrate** that **an important empirical link** exists between natural resource extraction and armed violence. To establish this link, **we use a recent** National Research Council (**NRC**; 2008) **study** **to identify 10 minerals** that are critical to the functioning of the U.S. economy and/or military (platinum, palladium, rhodium, manganese, indium, niobium, vanadium, titanium, copper, and rare earth elements) **and** then **ask whether** the **extraction** of these minerals **has involved** the use of **armed violence** at any point **in the past** 10 to **15 years**. We define armed violence as violence and threatened violence perpetrated by military, police, mercenary, and rebel forces, and thus we investigate violent acts such as military and police forces beating, arresting, or firing weapons at protestors, the use of mercenaries to provide mine security, the forced removal of local populations, and the use of forced labor to carry out resource extraction activities. **We supplement this** descriptive, but decontextualized, **analysis** **with** a set of **case studies** that examine more fully the violent activities associated with the extraction of two of these minerals (manganese and copper) **and** then briefly **discuss examples** of armed violence **associated with** the world’s three largest **mining companies**, with African mines that receive World Bank funding, and with petroleum and rainforest timber extraction. **[this]** Presenting these case studies and briefly discussing these companies, mines, and nonmineral resources **allows us to (a) empirically** **evaluate** aspects of **our theoretical model** that we are otherwise unable to evaluate, **(b) address** a slight **bias in** the critical **mineral data** that we discuss in a subsequent section of the article, and **(c) illustrate more clearly** some of the **ways** **in** **which** **violence is associated with** natural resource **extraction**.

The impact is the death of millions and war. Renner[[9]](#footnote-9) ‘02

Though a somewhat extreme case, **Angola** **is** merely **one of numerous places** **in the developing world wher**e abundant **natural resources help fuel conflicts**. (See Appendix 1, page 65). Altogether, about a quarter of the roughly **50 wars and armed conflicts active in 2001 have a strong resource dimension--**in the sense that legal or illegal **resource exploitation helped trigger or exacerbate violent conflict or financed its continuation**. **The human toll** of these resource-related conflicts **is** simply **horrendous**. Rough estimates suggest that **more than** **5 million people** were **killed** during the 1990s. Close to **6 million fled to neighboring countries**, and anywhere from **11 to 15 million people were displaced** inside the borders of their home countries. But some people --warlords, corrupt governments, and unscrupulous corporate leaders -- benefited from the pillage, taking in billions of dollars. (See Table 1).

Impact calc:

A. Prefer systemic, high probability low magnitude impacts because each implicit internal link he doesn’t mention entails a massive decrease in risk because of a low probability, so the combination of links reduces the probability of the impact to virtually zero. Narrowly tailored links outweigh because the difference between the impacts is likely smaller than the differences in probability by powers of 10.

B. War destroys the value to life through psychological trauma and mass killings – Bosnia proves. Goldstein et al[[10]](#footnote-10) ‘

The war in Bosnia lasted approximately 31/2 years, and although military casualties were high for all sides, by far the greatest impact of the fighting was on civilians. It is estimated that >1.3 million Bosnians were displaced within the country, more than 800 000 became refugees to other nations, and up to one quarter of 1 million were killed,[1](http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/cgi/content/full/100/5/873" \l "B1%23B1" \t "_blank) 90% of whom were civilian.[2](http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/cgi/content/full/100/5/873" \l "B2%23B2" \t "_blank)The use of **violence** against civilians **in**times of**war has been** oneof **this century's most alarming**military**developments, creatingincreasing numbers of displaced persons and refugees**in the wake of regional and tribal conflict. Usually from among the poorest of their communities and largely women and children, little is known about the intensity and prevalence of their experiences or about the influence of those experiences on distress symptoms.**There have been** numerous **reports of mass killing**of civilians, **rape, and inhumane internment**during the war in Bosnia. The presentation of medical evidence at the United Nations War Crimes Tribunal derived from the excavation of mass graves and from work with women victims of rape has highlighted the work of the medicalcommunity in documenting some of the most brutal acts of the war.However,**the impact on the civilian population also included severephysical deprivation, psychological trauma, and profound disruptionof family and community life** among those who have survived the fighting. Despite considerable media coverage and important anecdotal accounts, there remains a paucity of systematically obtained information on the nature and prevalence of such experiences in civilian populations in Bosnia, particularly for highly vulnerable groups such as children.

Samset[[11]](#footnote-11) ’10 provides three independent warrants:

The resource curse. This explanation focuses on the negative effects of resource wealth at the country level. **Slow** economic **growth**, **corruption** and **authoritarian rule**, factors that tend to be associated with resource abundance; **make** **for** **unstable** domestic **polities**. The crowding out of the non-resource sector due to currency overvaluation and **rent-seeking hinders the** emergence of a **middle class**. The dominance of the state-controlled extractive sector renders the economy vulnerable to the volatility of commodity prices on the world market, which complicates long-term planning and exposes the resource- rich country to **boom-and-bust cycles**. This vulnerability, combined with the global peripheralization of commodity- exporting economies, **can create breeding ground for conflict.** Le Billon (2008: 347) sums up broader findings on these macro-level dynamics as follows: “**the characteristics of countries most vulnerable to civil war since 1946 are** low per capita income, **declining** economic **growth** rate, “**weak” state** coercive **capacity** and institutional authority, **and** political **regimes in transition**.” Countries that are rich in resources but where most of the population is poor tend to develop governance problems and weak institutions as they start depending on exporting high-value commodities. **If** such **countries see falling** economic **growth** and political transition **they will be** particularly **vulnerable to conflict**; or so the account goes. At the more micro level, in resource-dependent countries **citizens have few** economic **opportunities** outside of the extractive sector; they depend on an often corrupt public sector; **and find few avenues to voice** their **concerns** due to the repressive nature of the rentier state – **all** of which are **traits** that can be **conducive to violent conflict**.Resource conflicts. In this framework, akin to the “grievance” account of civil war; **conflicts arise in response to** various **actors‟ attempts to control** the **finite pool of natural resources**. In the analysis of Le Billon (2008: 349), such “resource conflicts” comprise both “livelihood conflicts pertaining mostly to renewable resources” and “national or military resource security pertaining to mostly nonrenewable resources such as oil and „strategic‟ minerals.” **Resource conflicts** hence **arise because of** the perceived importance of the resources in question, be they renewable or nonrenewable, and because of different actors‟ **seemingly incompatible claims** to these resources.Conflict resources. In this third account, resources connect to conflict because they constitute an opportunity for enrichment and profit for individuals and organizations. The **high value of** the **resources** **attracts agents with an economic agenda** who are **willing to take up arms**, and/or to encourage or force others to do so, in order to access the resources and the profits derived from extracting and selling them. While an early version of this argument focused on how resources chiefly attract civilians to take up arms as part of an insurgency (e.g. Collier & Hoeffler 2004), later accounts have focused on how resources can become “conflict resources” also as a result of activities by regular army soldiers and state agents more broadly, and by agents from beyond the conflict scene (Snyder & Bhavnani, 2005; Humphreys, 2005).

Turns inner freedom- action is no longer a product of independent rational will but psychological complexes- the agents capacity to self determine is non existent in the neg world. Prioritizing environmental protection solves the root causes of resource conflicts. UNEP[[12]](#footnote-12) ‘09

Since 1990 at least eighteen violent conflicts have been fuelled by the exploitation of natural resources. In fact, recent research suggests that over the last sixty years at least forty percent of all intrastate conflicts have a link to natural resources. Civil wars such as those in Liberia, Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo have centred on “high-value” resources like timber, diamonds, gold, minerals and oil. Other conflicts, including those in Darfur and the Middle East, have involved control of scarce resources such as fertile land and water. As the global population continues to rise, and the demand for resources continues to grow, there is significant potential for conflicts over natural resources to intensify in the coming decades. In addition, the potential consequences of climate change for water availability, food security, prevalence of disease, coastal boundaries, and population distribution may aggravate existing tensions and generate new conflicts.Environmental factors are rarely, if ever, the sole cause of violent conflict. Ethnicity, adverse economic conditions, low levels of international trade and conflict in neighbouring countries are all significant drivers of violence. However, the exploitation of natural resources and related environmental stresses can be implicated in all phases of the conflict cycle, from contributing to the outbreak and perpetuation of violence to undermining prospects for peace. In addition, the environment can itself fall victim to conflict, as direct and indirect environmental damage, coupled with the collapse of institutions, can lead to environmental risks that threaten people’s health, livelihoods and security.Because the way that natural resources and the environment are governed has a determining influence on peace and security, these issues can also contribute to a relapse into conflict if they are not properly managed in post-conflict situations. Indeed, preliminary findings from a retrospective analysis of intrastate conflicts over the past sixty years indicate that conflicts associated with natural resources are twice as likely to relapse into conflict in the first five years. Nevertheless, fewer than a quarter of peace negotiations aiming to resolve conflicts linked to natural resources have addressed resource management mechanisms.The recognition that environmental issues can contribute to violent conflict underscores their potential significance as pathways for cooperation, transformation and the con- solidation of peace in war-torn societies. Natural resources and **the environment can contribute to peacebuilding through economic development and** the **generation of employment, while cooperation over** the management of **shared** natural **resources** **provides new** **opportunities** **for peacebuilding**. These factors, however, must be taken into consideration from the outset. Indeed, deferred action or poor choices made early on are easily “locked in,” establishing unsustainable trajectories of recovery that can undermine the fragile foundations of peace.**Integrating environment** and natural resources **into peacebuilding is** no longer an option – it is **a security imperative**. The establishment of the UN Peacebuilding Commission provides an important chance to address environmental risks and capitalize on potential opportunities in a more consistent and coherent way.In this context, UNEP recommends that the UN Peace- building Commission and the wider international community consider the following key recommendations for integrating environment and natural resource issues into peacebuilding interventions and conflict prevention:1. Further develop UN capacities for early warning and early action: The UN system needs to strengthen its capacity to deliver early warning and early action in countries that are vulnerable to conflicts over natural resources and environmental issues. At the same time, the effective governance of natural resources and the environment should be viewed as an investment in conflict prevention.2. Improve oversight and protection of natural resources during conflicts: **The** international **community needs to increase oversight of “high-value” resources** in international trade in order **to minimize** the **potential** for these resources **to finance conflict**. International sanctions should be the primary instrument dedicated to stopping the trade in conflict resources and the UN should require Member States to act against sanctions violators. At the same time, new legal instruments are required to protect natural resources and environmental services during violent conflict.3. Address natural resources and the environment as part of the peacemaking and peacekeeping process: During peace mediation processes, wealth-sharing is one of the fundamental issues that can “make or break” a peace agreement. In most cases, this includes **the sharing of natural resources**, including minerals, timber, land and water. It **is** therefore **critical** that parties **to** a **peace** **mediation** process are given sufficient technical information and training to make informed decisions on the sustainable use of natural resources. Subsequent peacekeeping operations need to be aligned with national efforts to improve natural resource and environmental governance.4. Include natural resources and environmental issues into integrated peacebuilding strategies: The UN often undertakes post-conflict operations with little or no prior knowledge of what natural resources exist in the affected country, or of what role they may have played in fuelling conflict. In many cases it is years into an intervention before the management of natural resources receives sufficient attention. **A failure to respond to** the **environmental** and natural resource **needs** of the population **can** complicate the task of fostering peace and even **contribute to conflict relapse**.5. Carefully harness natural resources for economic recovery: Natural resources can only help strengthen the post-war economy and contribute to economic recovery if they are managed well. The international community should be prepared to help national authorities manage the extraction process and revenues in ways that do not increase risk of further conflict, or are unsustainable in the longer term. This must go hand in hand with ensuring accountability, transparency, and environmental sustainability in their management.6. Capitalize on the potential for environmental co- operation to contribute to peacebuilding: Every state needs to use and protect vital natural resources such as forests, water, fertile land, energy and biodiversity. **Environmental issues** can thus **serve** **as** an effective platform or **catalyst** **for enhancing dialogue, building confidence, exploiting shared interests and broadening cooperation** between divided groups, as well as between states.Executive summary

Turns deontological NCs:

A. Developing countries allow themselves to be controlled by developed nations and international mechanisms of coercion, which is a violation of state’s outer freedom. States allow themselves to be used as a means to the ends of wealthier nations, which doesn’t accord themselves with the respect due as a rational body of collective reasoning and interferes with the ability to set their own ends- I solve by empowering states to limit and thus control their own resources.

B. no intention-foresight distinction - mental states like intention or motivation evaluate agents but have no bearing on action. Enoch[[13]](#footnote-13) summarizes Thomson

**Think about a hard medical decision** – say, **whether to give a suffering patient a deadly dose of morphine in order to relieve his pain**(at the price of his likely death). **And let’s assume that**in the circumstances**the**(medically, and also morally)**right thing to do is to give the morphine**. Now add the following piece of information: **The physician** making the decision and administering the procedure enjoys perverted pleasures from killing patients. If he gives the patient the morphine, he will do it intending to enjoy these perverted pleasures. He **foresees that the patient’s pain will be relieved [by a morphine dose], but this is not why he acts as he does.** Of course, now that we know these disturbing facts about the doctor and his relevant mental states, we will morally judge him accordingly, and will no doubt try to let someone else decide about the appropriate procedures. But – and this is the crucial point in our context – should this information make us change our mind regarding the permissibility of the relevant action? Could facts about these mental states of the doctor giving the morphine make us take back our judgments that this is the appropriate action in the circumstances, even when all other factors are held equal? The answer, it seems, is “no”. Thomson suggests that we learn from such examples that **the agent’s mental states are**simply**irrelevant for the moral permissibility of the relevant action. They are** very **relevant**, of course, **for theevaluation of the agent, but this is an entirely different story**. And **because mental states are irrelevant for the moral status of the action, the intending-foreseeing distinction, understood as a distinction between two mental states, and applied to the moral evaluation of actions, is without moral weight**22. Of course, as it stands this line of thought is too quick. Strictly speaking, what the example at most shows is that sometimes the agent's mental states are irrelevant to the permissibility of the relevant action, not that they never are. But the strength of the intuitive judgment Thomson uses, together with the distinction between the evaluation of the action and that of the agent, and given the absence of an obvious rationale for why it is that the mental states should be relevant to permissibility in some circumstances but not others – all these factors together strongly suggest, I think, the more general conclusion.

Intention, is irrelevant in evaluating the content of an action- violence is bodily harm which violates agents freedom, and no distinction commits agents to aggregation.

C. The form of developing nations is not to develop but protect their environment- empirical cases of development don’t reflect their constitutive aim but rather coercion by higher organizations

## Contention 2: Economy

Resource rich countries are plagued by economic and politic instability- multiple warrants. Beevers[[14]](#footnote-14)

As the Mozambican economy becomes increasingly dominated by the extractive resource sector, it is likely to have effects on the country’s economic structure. What I mean by this is that **developing countries that are heavily dependent on** exports of oil or other mineral **resources tend to** (paradoxically) **suffer from economic decline and political dysfunction. There is a fairly robust literature that suggests resource-dependent economies grow**th **more slowly than resource poor ones** partially **because [First] developing countries with global commodities tend to suffer from poor terms of trade, which undermines the local currency** (Sachs and Warner 2001; Easterly et al. 1993). Likewise, **[Second] once countries become dependent on resource revenues they become more sensitive to** the inevitable **“boom and bust” cycles that destabilize economies** in ways that can create political problems (Ross 1999). **Finally** evidence suggests that in resource dependent economies – to which Mozambique aspires — **[Third] economic growth often slows to a halt because profits are gradually captured by foreign companies and political elites with little of the revenue actually accruing to the government for investment in basic services** (health and education), state institutions, infrastructure and/or human capital (Ross 2003). For this reason, it is common for developing countries with natural resource-based economies to maintain high rates of poverty and infant mortality.

Turns economy negs and outweighs- I isolate long term conditions that makes economic collapse inevitable- her link evidence at best describes short term fluctuations which happen constantly- I control the link to her impacts by creating a mechanism for growth that overcomes a short shock from loss of extraction. Resource extraction kills growth- it quashes other economic sectors. Pegg[[15]](#footnote-15) ‘03

Economists have noted a paradox in the eco- nomic performance of developing countries - contrary to expectations, resource-rich countries have tended to grow more slowly than resource-poor countries. This negative effect has been observed across time and in countries with widely varying incomes, population sizes, types of government, and religious and ethnic compositions. In fact, this phenomenon has proven so persistent that it has been characterized as a "constant motif of economic history."39 **Numerous empirical studies have confirmed that resource wealth tends to have a strong negative effect on economic growth.**40 For example, the World Bank Mining Department's own recent study of the effects of mining on economic growth found that on average, as mineral dependence increases, economic performance decreases.41 According to the World Bank's study, while GDP per capita grew by 1.7 percent per year on average in all of the developing and transition economies throughout the 1990s, it contracted by 2.3 percent per year in those countries in which mining comprised over 50 percent of exports.42 In the 48 mining countries considered by the study - where mining products contribute six per- cent or more of all exports - GDP contracted by 1.15 percent per year, a decline over the course of the decade of about 11 percent.43 As one academic (and former visiting World Bank researcher) noted, "[b]y any meas- ure, this is a catastrophic record."44 A similar negative effect has been observed in oil-producing countries. Between 1965 and 1998, member countries of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) experienced a decrease in their per capita GNP (Gross National Product/Income) of 1.3 percent per year on average, while lower- and middle-income countries as a whole grew by an average rate of 2.2 percent per year.45Sub-Saharan African countries have not escaped the negative effects of resource dependence on growth rates. According to the World Bank's study, while the economies of sub-Saharan African countries contracted by 0.8 percent throughout the 1990s, min-ing countries in the region did even worse, contracting by 1 percent per year, or 25 percent more than the region as a whole.46 Perhaps nowhere in the world has resource-led development more spectacularly failed to catalyze economic growth than in Nigeria, where per capita income remains at less than $1 a day, despite the fact that $300 billion in oil rents have been generated over the past 25 years.47Researchers have put forward several explana- tions for how natural resource wealth may depress long-term growth rates, noting two effects that work in tandem to suppress domestic growth rates. **Resource booms** tend **to cause: (1) real exchange rates to rise due to the large inflows of foreign exchange** generated by the increased resource exports; **and (2) labor and capi- tal to migrate to the** booming **resource sector** from other productive sectors.48 Together, **these** two **effects result in higher costs and reduced competitiveness** for domestically produced goods and services, thereby **reducing agricultural and manufacturing exports**.49 Thus, natural **resource booms** can **"crowd out"** other **important export sectors** of the economy **and render them uncompetitive**.50 This phenomenon has come to be known as "Dutch Disease" after the negative effects of the North Sea oil boom on industrial production in the Netherlands.“Dutch Disease” has manifested itself in sever- al African countries that have experienced booms in their extractives sectors. For example, the oil boom in Congo-Brazzaville saw a marked decline in the pro- duction of coffee, cocoa, and sugar as rural dwellers left the plantations for the cities. Cameroon also experi- enced “Dutch Disease” during its oil boom of the early 1980s, as oil grew to account for two-thirds of export earnings.51 And in Gabon, a country that has neverproduced enough food to feed its population, oil dependence has exacerbated the deficiencies of the agricultural sector to the point where only about one percent of total land area is under cultivation.52 As a result, Gabon now depends entirely on imported food.53

Prefer this evidence:

A. Empirics confirm- a survey of the entire literature and crosscountry empirical work over thirty years flow aff. Robinson et al[[16]](#footnote-16):

Scholars of the industrial revolution and economic historians traditionally emphasized the great benefits which natural resources endowed on a nation.1 Paradoxically however, **it is now almost conventional wisdom that resources are a curse for currently developing countries**. **This claim is supported both by some basic facts**, for example, for **OPEC as a whole GDP per capita on average decreased by 1.3% each year from 1965 to** 19**98** (Gylfason, 2001), **and by crosscountry empirical work** (Sachs and Warner, 1995, 1999; Busby et al., 2004; Mehlum et al., 2006). **Moreover, numerous case studies of resource dependent economies have linked resource abundance to poor development** (Gelb, 1988; Karl, 1997; Ross, 1999, 2001).

B. Accounts for her ev and affirms- I solve for political stability that make economic gains valuable. Robinson 2[[17]](#footnote-17):

The key question is what are the mechanisms linking natural resource endowments and their prices to development. Interestingly, the evidence seems overwhelming that bad economic policies are correlated with resource rents. **The empirical literature on the resource curse consistently emphasizes that** **resource dependent economies and** resource **booms seem to lead to highly dysfunctional state behavior**, particularly large public sectors and unsustainable budgetary policies. For instance, Newberry (1986, p. 334) argues that **economists have had a missing element in their interpretation of the bad performance of many resource abundant countries since they assume a world with no government while their behaviour is really the key element**. He notes that¶ bIt is also I suppose encouraging for economists because it must surely be very easy to go round and advise countries that experience booms to do various things which would clearly make things better. They make such large and obvious mistakes.Q¶ **The large** and obvious **mistakes are** those **made clear by different case studies, in particular the study of six oil exporting countries** (Algeria, Ecuador, Indonesia, Nigeria, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela) by Gelb (1986). **Summarizing the experiences** from the case studies **Gelb** (1988, p. 139) **concludes that** the most important recommendation to emerge from this study is that **spending levels should have been adjusted to sharp rises in income levels more cautiously** than they actually were**.**Q (italics in original). **The large World Bank project** overseen by Lal and Myint (1996) **came to the same conclusion since they identify policy failure as the prime cause of the underperformance of the resource abundant countries** and **the collection of case studies** in Auty (2001) **shows the same picture for those resource abundant countries** that has failed to grow **in that there seems to be** (p. 132) **a chronic tendency for the state to become overexpanded.**

Robinson 3[[18]](#footnote-18) explains 3 additional causal factors

We emphasized several results which come from our model. **First, resources tend to be overextracted by politicians because they discount the future by the probability they remain in power.** **Second, permanent resource booms**, because they increase the value of being in power **lead politicians to allocate more resources to staying in power.** As a result they tend to discount the future less and this leads to more efficient resource extraction. The fact that booms increase the probability of staying in power tends to counteract the inefficiency stemming from the fact that politicians discount the future too much. **Third,** we showed that despite this optimistic result, **resource booms tend to create inefficiency in the rest of the economy because they encourage politicians to engage in inefficient redistribution to influence elections.** However, the extent to which this phenomenon actually leads to a resource curse (which we defined as a situation where a resource boom leads to lower GDP) depends on the quality of institutions. In countries with institutions which limit the ability of politicians to use clientelism to bias elections, resource booms tend to raise national income. When such institutions are absent, the perverse political incentives may dominate and income can fall— there is a resource curse.

Economic crisis crushes political stability globally, causes poverty and deprivation. Arias[[19]](#footnote-19) 2k

Recent events in Ecuador have demonstrated just how fragile democracy can be when the people of a country face extreme hardships in their daily lives. It was the **hunger**, the **suffering** **and** the **anger** of the Ecuadoran people that **made it possible for the military to depose the** constitutionally elected **government**. The **depth of** the **economic crisis**in Ecuador**made that nation** particularly **susceptible to political instability**, but widespread**poverty and deprivation put democracy at risk** throughoutLatin America and around the world. Although Latin American armed forces have generally submitted themselves to civilian authority in recent years, the potential for a rise in militarism and despotism will remain if Latin American leaders fail to address the needs of their countries.

Turns deont:

A. Regardless of the intrinsic right making questions of right and wrong action that is relevant to an individual agent, those agents exist in a state and choose to use the state as vehicle to pursue the means to their ends. Thus from the state’s perspective it is obligated to pursue consequences. If the agents employ a bad tool for their ends the wrongness is not on the state in that case- it is upon the individuals who initiated the state as a mechanism for their ends. Thus the state must bring about the willed state of affiars, which is just consequentialism.

B. No act-omission distinction for governments. Sunstein[[20]](#footnote-20):

In our view, any effort to distinguish between acts and omissions goes wrong by overlooking the distinctive features of government as a moral agent. If correct, this point has broad implications for criminal and civil law. Whatever the general status of the act/omission distinction as a matter of moral philosophy,the distinction is least impressive when applied to government, because the most plausible underlying considerations do not apply to official actors.  The most fundamental point is that **unlike individuals, governments always** and necessarily **face a choice** between or **among possible policies for regulating third parties.** **The distinction between acts and omissions** may not be intelligible in this context, and even if it is, the distinction **does not make a morally relevant difference.** Most generally, government is in the business of creating permissions and prohibitions. **When it explicitly or implicitly authorizes private action, it is not omitting to do anything** or refusing to act. **Moreover, the distinction** between authorized and unauthorized private action – for example, private killing – **becomes obscure when government formally forbids private action but chooses a set of policy** instruments **that do not adequately** or fully **discourage it.** If there is no act-omission distinction, then government is fully complicit with any harm it allows, so decisions are moral if they minimize harm. All means based and side constraint theories collapse because two violations require aggregation.

This means some side constraint will always be violated, so the government should minimize violations.

C. Economic decline violates agents freedom- it puts the poor in inconsistent with the rightful condition. Ripstein[[21]](#footnote-21)

Kant argues that provision for the poor follows directly from the very idea of a united will. He remarks that **the idea of a united** lawgiving **will re- quires** that **citizens regard the state as existing in perpetuity**.6 By this he does not mean to impose an absurd requirement that people live forever, or even the weaker one that it must sustain an adequate population, or make sure that all of its members survive.7 **The state does need to main- tain its material preconditions**, and as we saw in Chapter 7, **this need gen- erates its entitlement to “administer the state’s economy** and finance.”8 The state’s existence in perpetuity, however, is presented as a pure normative requirement, grounded in its ability to speak and act for everyone. That ability must be able to survive changes in the state’s membership. You are the same person you were a year ago because your normative principle of organization has stayed the same through changes in the mat- ter making you up. As a being entitled to set and pursue your own pur- poses, you decide what your continuing body will do. That is why your deeds can be imputed to you even after every molecule in your body has changed, and even if you have forgotten what you did. The **unity of your agency is created** **by** **the normative principle that makes your actions im- putable to you.**9 In the same way, **the state must sustain its basic norma- tive principle** of organization **through time**, even as some members die or move away and new ones are born or move in. As we saw in Chapter 7, its unifying principle—“in terms of which alone we can think of the legiti- macy of the state”—is the idea of the original contract, through which people are bound by laws they have given themselves through public in- stitutions.10 The state must have the structure that is required in order for everyone to be bound by it, so that it can legitimately claim to speak and act for all across time. The requirement of unity across time is clear in the cases of legislation by officials: if the official’s decision were only binding while a particular human being held office, a citizen would be entitled to regard laws as void once the official’s term ended. Because each person is master of him- or herself, one person is only bound by the authority of another through the idea of a united will. So the idea of a united will pre- supposes some manner in which it exists through time. Past legislation, like past agreement, can only bind those who come after if the structure through which laws are made is one that can bind everyone it governs.The solution to this family of problems is a self-sustaining system that guarantees that all citizens stand in the right relation to each other and, in particular, do not stand in any relation inconsistent with their sharing a united will.**The** most obvious **way in which people** could **fail to share** such **a will is through relations of private dependence through which one person is subject to the choice of another**. **A serf** or slave **does not share a** united **will with his** or her lord or **master, so these** forms of **relationship are in- consistent with a rightful condition**. Yet the same relation of dependence can arise through a series of rightful actions. The problem of **poverty**, on Kant’s analysis, **is exactly that: the poor are completely subject to the choice of those in more fortunate circumstances.**Although Kant argues that there is an ethical duty to give to charity,11 the crux of his argument is that dependence on private charity is incon- sistent with its benefactor and beneficiary sharing the united will that is required for them to live together in a rightful condition. The difficulty is that the poor person is subject to the choice of those who have more: they are entitled to use their powers as they see fit, and so the decision whether to give to those in need, or how much to give, or to which people, is en- tirely discretionary.12 So long as there are a variety of unmet wants, private persons are entitled to determine which ones to attach priority to.

## Underview

Lastly, my burden is to prove it would be more desirable for a developing country to act on the resolutional maxim, and the negative must prove it less desirable to act on that maxim. By embedding desirability into its evaluative structure, comparing worlds eliminates the infinite variety of skeptical objections available to the neg under truth-testing. Truth-testing prescribes an absolute, unmeetable burden to the aff. Nelson[[22]](#footnote-22):

And **the truth-statement model** of the resolution **imposes an absolute burden of proof on the aff**irmative: if the resolution is a truth-claim, and the affirmative has the burden of proving that claim, in so far as intuitively we tend to disbelieve truth-claims until we are persuaded otherwise, the affirmative has the burden to prove that statement absolutely true. Indeed, one of the most common theory arguments in LD is conditionality, which argues it is inappropriate for the affirmative to claim only proving the truth of part of the resolution is sufficient to earn the ballot. Such a model of the resolution also gives the negative access to a range of strategies that many students, coaches, and judges find ridiculous or even irrelevant to evaluation of the resolution. **If the neg**ative **need only prevent the aff**irmative **from proving the truth of the resolution, it is** logically **sufficient to negate to deny our ability to make truth-statements** or to prove normative morality does not exist or to deny the reliability of human senses or reason. Yet, even though most coaches appear to endorse the truth-statement model of the resolution, they complain about the use of such negative strategies, even though they are a necessary consequence of that model. And, moreover, **such strategies** seem fundamentally unfair, as they **provide the neg**ative **with** functionallyinfinite ground, as there are **a nearly infinite variety of** such **skeptical objections to normative claims, while continuing to bind the aff**irmative **to a much smaller range of options: advocacy of the resolution as a whole.**

This means no skep, presumption, permissibility, triggers, or NIBS- offense most stem from a post fiat world.

# Frontlines

## FW Weighing

### Actor Specificity

1. Resolution Context- Ethical theories might be true in the abstract but practical considerations make different ethical systems applicable only to governments so my framework has a stronger link to the resolution, makes it more predictable and real world.

2. Probability-Even if his ethic is correct my theory has a higher probability of truth since it is empirically used by the government. Util is the only moral system available to policy-makers. **Goodin 90** writes[[23]](#footnote-23)

My larger argument turns on the proposition that there is something special about the situation of public officials that makes utilitarianism more probable for them than private individuals. Before proceeding with the large argument, I must therefore say what it is that makes it so special about public officials and their situations that make it both more necessary and more desirable for them to adopt a more credible form of utilitarianism. Consider, first, the argument from necessity. **Public officials** are obliged to **make** their **choices under uncertainty**, and uncertainty **of a** very **special sort** at that. All choices – public and private alike – are made under some degree of uncertainty, of course. But in the nature of things, **private individuals** will usually **have more** complete **information on** the peculiarities of their own circumstances and on **the ramifications** that alternative possible **choices might have** for them. **Public officials**, in contrast, **are** relatively **poorly informed as to the effects** that **their choices will have on individuals, one by one.** What **they** typically **do know are** generalities: **averages and aggregates. They know what will happen most often to most people** as a result of their various possible choices, **but that is all. That** is enough to **allow** public **policy-makers to use** the **util**itarian **calculus** – assuming they want to use it at all – to chose general rules or conduct.

3. Strength of link-

A. I control UQ on link to actor specificity since it’s a comparative meta standard- even if util is flawed those are only defects with the theory that can be solved by modifying the decision procedure- that’s Sinnot-Armstrong 2- she needs to win her framework is better in terms of state action. Zero percent of a link turn- governments by definition can’t control inner freedom

B. Nonuniques her offense- states may aim at development but that happens in a consequentialist way given there’s no intent/foresight and no act/omission distinction. Strength of link determines size of impact, so default aff.

### Intutions

A. Probability- we ought to give concrete intuitions more credence than abstract moral theories. McMahan[[24]](#footnote-24)

It is important to be clear about the nature of this challenge. The claim is not simply that intuitions often strike us as more obvious or less open to doubt than it seems that any moral theory is. By itself, this would not be a strong consideration in favor of the intuition. The theories of modern physics tell us that many of our common sense beliefs about the nature of the physical world are mistaken. Many of these beliefs seem overwhelmingly obvious while the theory that disputes them may be so recondite and arcane as to be unintelligible to all but a few. Yet most of us recognize that at least **certain scientific theories** **that** **overturn aspects of our common sense** conception of the physical world **are so well established** by their powers of explanation and prediction and by the control they give us over the forces of nature that **we** readily **acquiesce** in their claims and concede that our common sense views must be illusory. If a moral theory could command our allegiance by comparable means of persuasion, we might yield our intuitions to it without demur, even if it had none of the immediate obviousness in which our intuitions tend to come clothed. But the challenge to the Theoretical Approach is that **no moral theory**, at least at the present stage of the history of philosophical ethics, **can have** anything like **the authority** or degree **of validation that the best supported scientific theories have**. The lamentable truth is that **we are** at present deeply **uncertain** even **about** **what** types of **consideration** support or **justify a moral theory**. There are no agreed criteria for determining whether or to what extent a moral theory is justified. So **when an intuition,** which may be immediately compelling**, comes into conflict with** a **moral theory**, which can have nothing approaching the authority of a well grounded scientific theory, it is not surprising that **we should** often **be profoundly reluctant to abandon the intuition** at the bidding of the theory. We can, indeed, be reasonably confident in advance that none of the moral theories presently on offer is sufficiently credentialed to make it rationally required that we surrender our intuition.

B. Motivating- people will follow the dictates of a moral theory if it matches their convictions because they’re already motivated by existing beliefs. Morality is fundamentally a guide to action, so it’d be useless if agents weren’t bound to likely follow it, so prefer my framework even if he wins links to higher standards.

## Alt FW

### Universalizability

Moral theories fundamentally divide as consequentialist and non-consequentialist. Non-consequentialists prescribe *patterns* of behavior—acting on the categorical imperative, manifesting virtues, respecting rights, etc.—to be instantiated by all agents in their own lives, even if the instantiation of that pattern results in the pattern being less fully realized overall. But, consequentialists reverse that order; consequentialists claim that the promotion of certain neutral values or patterns make an action right regardless of whether that pattern is instantiated in the agent’s own life. Regardless of the type of theory, all moral judgments must be universalizable. If we think that it is right for one agent to act in a certain way in some circumstance, then that same judgment must hold for any similarly situated agent because there are no *a priori* morally relevant differences between agents.

Only consequentialism can meet this universalizability requirement. Universalizing non-consequentialism results in a conflict in normative reasons. Pettit**[[25]](#footnote-25)**

**Every prescription as to what an agent ought to do should be capable of being universalised**, so that it applies not just to that particular agent, and not just to that particular place or time or context or whatever. So at any rate we generally assume in our moral reasoning. If we think that it is right for one agent in one circumstance to act in a certain way, but wrong for another, then we commit ourselves to there being some further descriptive difference between the two cases, in particular a difference of a non-particular or universal kind.

Thus, **if we say that an agent A ought to choose option O in circumstances C** — these may bear on the character of the agent, the behaviour of others, the sorts of consequences on offer, and the like — **then** we assume **that** something similar **would hold for any similarly placed agent.** We do not think that the particular identity of agent A is relevant to what A ought to do, any more than we think that the particular location or date is relevant to that issue. In making an assumption about what holds for any agent in C-type circumstances, of course, we may not be committing ourselves to anything of very general import. It may be, for all the universalisability constraint requires, that C-type circumstances are highly specific: so specific, indeed, that no other agent is ever likely to confront them.

There is no difficulty in seeing how the universalisability challenge is supposed to be met under consequentialist doctrine. **Suppose that I accept consequentialis[m]**t doctrine **and believe** of an agent that in their particular circumstances, C, he or she ought to choose an option O. For simplicity, suppose that I am myself that agent and that as a believer in consequentialism I think of myself that I ought to do O in C. **If that option** really **is right** by my consequentialist lights, **then that will be because of the neutral values that it promotes. But if those neutral values make O the right option for me in those circumstances, so they will make it the right option for any other agent in such circumstances.** Thus I can readily square the prescription to which my belief in consequentialism leads with my belief in universalisability. I can happily universalise my self-prescription to a prescription for any arbitrary agent in similar circumstances. In passing, a comment on the form of the prescription that the universalisability challenge will force me to endorse. I need not think that it is right that in the relevant circumstances every agent do O; that suggests a commitment to a collective pattern of behaviour. I will only be forced to think, in a person-by-person or distributive way, that for every agent it is right that in those circumstances he or she do O. Let doing O in C amount to swimming to the help of a child in trouble. Universalisability would not force me to think that everyone ought to swim to the help of a child in such a situation; undoubtedly they would frustrate one another’s efforts. It only requires me to think, as we colloquially put it, that anyone ought to swim to the help of the child; it only requires a person-by-person prescription, not a collective one. So much for the straightforward way in which consequentialism can make room for universalisability. But how is the universalisability challenge supposed to be met under non-consequentialist theories? **According to non-consequentialist theory, the right choice for any agent is to instantiate a certain pattern, P;** this may be the pattern of conforming to the categorical imperative, manifesting virtue, respecting rights, honouring their special obligations, or whatever. **Suppose that I accept such a theory and that it leads me to say** of an agent — again, let us suppose, myself — **that I ought to choose O in** these circumstances, **C,** or that O is the right choice for me in these circumstances. Can I straightforwardly say, as I could under consequentialist doctrine, that just for the reasons that O is the right choice for me — in this case, that it involves instantiating pattern, P — so it will be the right choice for any agent in C-type circumstances? I shall argue that there are difficulties in the path of such a straightforward response and that these raise a problem for non-consequentialism. The problem **Suppose that I do say**, in the straightforward way, **that pattern P requires, not just that I do O in C, but also**, for any agent whatsoever, that **that [any] agent should do O in C as well.** Suppose I say, in effect, that it is right for me to do O in C only if it would be right for any agent X to do O in C. **Whatever makes it right that I do O in C makes it right, so the response goes, that any agent do O in C.**

**This respons**e is going to **lead[s]** me, as **a non-consequentialist** thinker**, into trouble. Judging that something is right gives one a normative reason to prefer it**; **the judgment of rightness must provide such a reason if it is to have an action-guiding role. When I think that it is right that I do O in C,** therefore, **then I commit myself to there being a normative reason for me to prefer that I do O. And when I assert that it is right that anyone should do O in C**-type circumstances**, then I commit myself** — again, because of the reason-giving force of the notion of rightness — **to there being a normative reason** for holding a broader preference. I commit myself to there being a normative reason for me **to prefer**, with any agent whatsoever, that in C-type circumstances **that [any] agent do O**.

The problem with **these reasons** and these commitments, **however**, is that they may **come apart. For it is often** going to be **possible that**, perversely, **the best way for me to ensure** or increase the chance **that** for **any arbitrary agent**, X, that agent **does O in C**-type circumstances**, is to choose non-O myself in those circumstances**. The best way to satisfy the preference as to what the arbitrarily chosen agent should do may be to go against the preference as to what one should do oneself. The best way to get people to renounce violence may be to take it up oneself; the best way to get people to help their own children may be not to press for the advantage of one’s own; the best way to minimise murder may to commit a murder; and so on. More generally, **the best way to promote the instantiation of pattern, P**, where this is the basic pattern to which one swears non-consequentialist allegiance, **may be to flout that pattern oneself.** The best way to increase the chance that for any arbitrary agent, X, that agent instantiates P may be not to instantiate P oneself. How can I avoid the conclusion that in such a perverse situation I ought to promote the overall instantiation of my cherished pattern, even at the cost of not instantiating it myself? How, in other words, am I to keep faith with the non-consequentialist commitment to the rightness of instantiating P, even where this means that the overall realisation of the pattern falls short of what it might have been? It is hardly going to be plausible for me to say that normative reasons bearing on preferences over my own choices trump normative reasons bearing on preferences over how other people behave. Both sorts of reasons are supported in the common language of what is the right choice or of what ought to be done. And it would surely run against the spirit of universalisability — the spirit in which I deny that my own particular identity is important to the prescription defended — to say that a reasoned preference as to what I do myself should not be responsive to a similarly reasoned preference as to what people in general do — what arbitrary agent, X, does — in the sorts of circumstances in question. The upshot is **that if as a non-consequentialist** theorist **I** straightforwardly **universalise** the prescription that in a certain situation I should instantiate a favoured **pattern, P, then** the prescription to which I thereby commit myself — that in that situation any X ought to instantiate pattern, P — may force me to revise my original self-prescription. **I have equal reason to prefer both that I instantiate P and that any agent instantiate P** — this reason is expressed by the use of the word ‘right’ or ‘ought’ in each case — **and the spirit of universalisability blocks me from treating myself as** in any way **special. Thus, if the preferences are inconsistent in a certain situation** — if the choice is between my instantiating P alone, for example, or my acting so that many others instantiate P instead — **then I will have reason not to instantiate P myself**.As a would-be non-consequentialist thinker, my initial claim must have been that the point is to instantiate P in my own life, not promote it generally. But I countenance the general claims of the P-pattern **when I universalise** in the straightforward way: **I prescribe general conformity to that pattern, not just conformity in my own case. Thus** it now seems that what I must think is that this general conformity is to be promoted, even if that means not myself instantiating the pattern in my own behaviour or psychology or relationships. It seems that what **I must embrace**, in effect, is a **consequentialism** in which conformity to pattern P is the ultimate value to be promoted.

### No Act/Omission Distinction

No act-omission distinction for governments. Sunstein[[26]](#footnote-26):

In our view, any effort to distinguish between acts and omissions goes wrong by overlooking the distinctive features of government as a moral agent. If correct, this point has broad implications for criminal and civil law. Whatever the general status of the act/omission distinction as a matter of moral philosophy,the distinction is least impressive when applied to government, because the most plausible underlying considerations do not apply to official actors.  The most fundamental point is that **unlike individuals, governments always** and necessarily **face a choice** between or **among possible policies for regulating third parties.** **The distinction between acts and omissions** may not be intelligible in this context, and even if it is, the distinction **does not make a morally relevant difference.** Most generally, government is in the business of creating permissions and prohibitions. **When it explicitly or implicitly authorizes private action, it is not omitting to do anything** or refusing to act. **Moreover, the distinction** between authorized and unauthorized private action – for example, private killing – **becomes obscure when government formally forbids private action but chooses a set of policy** instruments **that do not adequately** or fully **discourage it.** If there is no act-omission distinction, then government is fully complicit with any harm it allows, so decisions are moral if they minimize harm. All means based and side constraint theories collapse because two violations require aggregation.

### Intuitions

Consequentialism has the most explanatory coherence overall and can explain more common moral intuitions. Sinnott-Armstrong[[27]](#footnote-27):

Consequentialism also might be supported by an inference to the best explanation of our moral intuitions. This argument might surprise those who think of consequentialism as counterintuitive, but in fact **consequentialists can explain many moral intutions that trouble deontological theories. Moderate deontologists, for example, often judge that it is morally wrong to kill one person to save five but not morally wrong to kill one person to save a million. They never specify the line between what is morally wrong and what is not morally wrong**, and it is hard to imagine any non-arbitrary way for deontologists to justify a cutoff point. In contrast, **consequentialists can simply say that the line belongs wherever the benefits outweigh the costs** (including any bad side effects). If consequentialists can better explain more common moral intuitions, then **consequentialism might have more explanatory coherence overall, despite being counterintuitive in some cases.** (Compare Sidgwick 1907, Book IV, Chap. III; Sinnott-Armstrong 2009; and Sverdlik 2011.) And even if act consequentialists cannot argue in this way, it still might work for rule consequentialists (such as Hooker 2000).

### Coherentism

Moral theorists agree that simplicity, consistency, and explanatory depth are epistemic virtues to which all moral thought aspires. Setiya

While there are variations within the family of **moral theorists**, as for instance in their conception of moral intuitions and the nature and degree of deference owed to them—matters to be examined shortly—they **share an epistemic commitment to theoretical virtues of simplicity,** power, **consistency, and** explanatory **depth.3 The aspiration of moral thought**, for moral theorists, **is the construction of a** relatively **simple consistent body of** moral **principles [that]** on the basis of which we **can justify a wide range of verdicts about**particular **cases.** “Justify” may but need not mean “deduce”: it is a matter of explaining why certain verdicts or subsidiary principles are correct, and an answer to the question “why?” does not always take the form of a valid proof.4 Explanatory depth in moral theory is measured by the extent to which it provides such justifications. Even though the principles that justify are no different in kind from the principles and verdicts justified, in that they are further moral claims, and even though justifications must come to an end, the point at which they do so can be more or less superficial.5 **It counts in favor of a moral theory**, other things being equal, **that its** purported **justifications are deep.**

Consequentialism is simple, consistent, and broad. If an action is wrong, then there is no coherent rationale that could forbid minimizing those wrongs. Setiya 2:

In what follows, I use the term “coherence” as shorthand for the theoretical virtues described above, passing over differences in the weight assigned to each of them by different moral theorists. In the limiting case, a theorist might give very minimal weight to simplicity or power, accepting complex explanations without attempting to extend them into novel ground.6 Still, even theorists of this kind try to avoid gratuitous complexity. More commonly, appeals to simplicity and power are allowed to put pressure on our intuitive beliefs. We could illustrate this phenomenon with various examples, of which I give three. The first is both simple and familiar: **even critics of** act-**utilitarianism** often **concede that its elegance and scope are** attractive, that they are **reasons to accept it** even if, on balance, the cost to moral intuition is too high. The second example is more complicated: debates about the allegedly paradoxical character of “agent-centered restrictions”—roughly, **moral principles that forbid us from acting in certain ways even to prevent more actions of the very same kind [are]**—rest on the apparent **difficult**y of **[to] assimilat[e]**ing these restrictions **to a coherent system of principles. What is the rationale for prohibiting [an] action** of a certain kind **if not to minimize its occurrence**, which agent-centered restrictions perversely rule out**?** Disputes about this simple question, even those which stress the force of moral intuition, typically give weight to considerations of explanatory power**.** Finally, a less familiar example: in proposing an account of right action as action motivated by moral virtue, Michael Slote (2001, 28) argues, on grounds of simplicity or theoretical unification, that benevolence is the only virtue there is. His argument is meant to provide defeasible support for the reduction of other putative virtues, like justice or courage, to “good or virtuous motivation involving benevolence or caring” (Slote 2001, 38). If this seems odd to you, as it does to me, you should ask how it differs from claims about the appeal of act-utilitarianism that many are given to accept.

# Theory

## Inner Freedom NC Bad

A. Interp: The negative must impact all offense to a framework capable of generating obligations or prohibition on action. To clarify, the negative may not read a case with a standard or burden of (insert standard)

B. Violation- She does

C. Standard:

1. Reciprocity

A. the NC terminates in permissibility- the conclusion is that everyone can do whatever they want because there exist no normative constraints on action, since action must only be a product of the will. That gives her a 2-1 structural advantage, because I can’t show the negative violates the NC- all actions get lost in permissibility. Reciprocity is key to fairness because equal access to offense determines access to the ballot.

B. Qualitative ground- even if the NC is structurally sufficient there is functionally zero turn ground- inner freedom is merely the agents subjective wills so her offense stems from the descriptive nature of what it means to use property as one pleases- her framework is exactly her offense. Ground is key to fairness because equal access to offense determines access to the ballot.

2. Predictability- there is a 0% risk a single author in the lit advocates her offense- it’s absurd to think anyone concludes people should do whatever they want. Arthur Ripstein is not a solvency advocate- she’s bastardizing the conclusion of the book and he doesn’t talk about EP v RE in terms of policies- that’s Black’s Law. Predictability is key to fairness because she has an unequal prep advantage on the NC.

D. Voter, vote on fairness, debate’s a competitive activity with wins and losses, and the ballot says vote for the better debater, not the better cheater. Drop the debater since 1. Unfairness has permanently skewed evaluation of the round for the aff- I’ve had to invest time and alter 1AR strategy to check abuse, but the 2N has 6 minutes so no neg RVI, 2. Reject the arg is no punishment- just let her pick a different layer which skews my only check on abuse. Use competing interps since 1. Any bright line for reasonability is arbitrary and bites judge intervention, 2. Reasonability forces a race to the bottom- debaters become increasingly abusive and get away with just defense on theory, 3. Competing interps fosters better norms with an offense defense paradigm by requiring the best possible practice for debate.

Preempts:

1. She’s going to say I can reinterpret the NC or alter a framework premise, but that’s non functional- obviously I can make defensive arguments on any framework to make it fair, but my shell indicts the way she formatted her NC- I shouldn’t have to do more work to make her NC fair

2. You can do it to is non responsible- how abusive I could’ve been is never proportional to how abusive her NC is, so it’s net preferable under competing interps to maintain competitive equity

3. there’s always a risk of offense for the aff on theory- the most fair possible standard is the one that maximizes distribution of ground for both debaters which has to be consequentialist since all impacts link.

## Form NC Bad

A. Interp: The negative must derive links to all offense from a post fiat advocacy which a world with states of affairs, not merely adjectives or modifiers to the word country in the resolution. To clarify, the negative may not read a case with a standard or burden of acting to increase development

B. Violation- She does

C. Standard: Qualitative Ground

There’s functionally zero turn ground for the aff under her interpretation of the NC standard because her offense derives from what it means to be a developing country- that it simply develops. I can’t show the negative is inconsistent with what is to be a developing country because her framework establishes a developing country is merely one that develops- the NC is a tautology. Couple of impacts:

1. It’s a necessary but insufficient - gives her a 2-1 structural advantage because there are great turns to util

2. skews aff strategy- forces me to overinvest on a layer I can’t win on and lets her pick the NC or the offense to the aff to go for in the 2NR

3. bad for clash and real world- she’s never responsible for the arguments she makes which incentivizes her to kick and avoiding answering defense

Ground is key to fairness because equal access to offense determines access to the ballot.

D. Voter, vote on fairness, debate’s a competitive activity with wins and losses, and the ballot says vote for the better debater, not the better cheater. Drop the debater since 1. Unfairness has permanently skewed evaluation of the round for the aff- I’ve had to invest time and alter 1AR strategy to check abuse, but the 2N has 6 minutes so no neg RVI, 2. Reject the arg is no punishment- just let her pick a different layer which skews my only check on abuse. Use competing interps since 1. Any bright line for reasonability is arbitrary and bites judge intervention, 2. Reasonability forces a race to the bottom- debaters become increasingly abusive and get away with just defense on theory, 3. Competing interps fosters better norms with an offense defense paradigm by requiring the best possible practice for debate.

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## A2 Spec

A. Counter Interp: The aff may defend the resolution as a general principle in all countries if the aff is willing to specify specific extractive industries to limit or specific solvency mechanisms for each country if the negative asks in CX and the aff generates no offense on specific scenarios in the AC

B. Reasons to Prefer

1. solves all his offense- specification is good in the abstract and I’ll do that if asked to- the links to my advantages stem from any policy that follows general prioritization so I meet my interp- combines the best of both worlds since I accrue benefits of spec in countries of the negative’s choosing

2. Research Burdens- her own offense indicates there’s over 100 countires and multiple mechanismis- that results in an massive case list and research burdens- forces debaters to prep 100s of case negs that may never be run. O/W:

A. infinite abuse- I have to a hundred times the work just to get equal access to the ballot, which means under her interp the round is never fair for any debater period

B. controls the internal link- we can’t access specific education arguments or quality ground if there are no limits- her

interp incentivizes debaters to find the most shock value interps farthest form the core of the lit

My interp solves- prep on one aff will link regardless of the advantages because I uniquely defend whole res

3. Ground- spec lets me pick the most desirable slice of the resolution and defend- there are literally no constraints on a fair plan under her interp so I can pick a plan that has a tangential link to the topic and shafts negative access to offense- my interp solves because I’ll only specify a fair plan at the negative’s request. O/W

A. bidirectional ground- my interp is net preferable because it makes the round fair to both debaters, instead of slightly advantaging the aff

B. structural skew- the neg literally has no strategy because the plan would be so narrow- no impact or solvency turn ground, also skews neg strategy, forces her to go for framework and turns education- makes case debate irrelvenat

**A2 T Prioritize**

A. Counter Interp: New Oxford American Dictionary defines prioritize as to “designate or **treat** (something) **as** **more** **important** than other things”

B. Reasons to Prefer

1. Predictability

A. Common Usage- the New Oxford prove the most common usage of prioritize in the English language is to actively treat as more important, so even if prioritize in the abstract means designate, that’s only meaningful in how it translates into action. Also proves framers intent flows aff- prioritization only happens when two things conflict but beliefs never do that- conflict for a developing country happens in real policies, which also means text flows aff. Independently, the Black’s Law definition means her interp collapses to mine- we rank policies in order- so legal precision affirms.

B. Topic Lit- authors discuss EP and RE as policies to be implemented and compared. Agyeman et al [[28]](#footnote-28)02

One final consideration is the relationship of the environmental security agenda to sustainability and justice concepts. **In recent years, a huge literature on** the subject of **conflicts** arising **from environmentally degraded communities or scarcity of natural resources has** permitted the environmental security paradigm to **enter[ed]** into post-Cold War **mainstream policy discussions**. In the absence of a Cold War enemy, military strategists have identified "the environment" as a flashpoint; a potential source of conflict. **Authors** writing on the subject **have documented** the **conflicts** that can emerge **as a result of ecological degradation and scarcity**, **particularly in developing countries** where there is great competition for land and resources (Tuchman-Mathews, 1989; Homer-Dixon, 1994; Kaplan, 1994). Deudney and Matthew (1999), however, argue that much of the empirical evidence for scarcity-induced conflict upon which the environmental security literature is based rests on "contested grounds" while Hartmann (1998) notes the lack of attention paid in the environmental security literature to the role of MNC interests in environmental degradation.

# Substance

## A2 Whitman REM DA

*(Strat here is to hopefully avoid reading this in the 1AR- it’s only useful if the offense on the low impact debate is heavy and the 1NC goes hard for extinction/magnitude first- ideally, go for a quick extension of low impacts first to exclude the disad- in any case, I lined down the cards so you can buzz through them in the 1AR)*

1. T/Rare earth metals fuel China-Japan conflict. Klabin[[29]](#footnote-29) ‘13

While China’s sociopathic neighbor-ward North Korea ratchets up regional tensions by [cutting all communication channels](http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/27/us-korea-north-idUSBRE92Q07E20130327) with South Korea in preparation for war, other geopolitical conflicts are spreading well beyond the region. World wars have been started over [smaller offenses](http://www.history.com/topics/the-death-of-archduke-franz-ferdinand-and-the-outbreak-of--world-war-i), so politicians have been eagerly trying to blow out various lit fuses.**Amid** disputed **Chinese** [**ownership claims**](http://www.policymic.com/articles/31151/is-china-bullying-its-neighbors-over-some-rocks-in-south-china-sea) **for** various **Pacific islands, Japanese scientists** have [**discovered vast reserves**](http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/ambroseevans_pritchard/9951299/Japan-breaks-Chinas-stranglehold-on-rare-metals-with-sea-mud-bonanza.html) **of rare earth metals in their territorial seabed**. These are the precious **metal types which fueled the** high-tech personal **computing revolution, and** are **essential for** the development of complex **weapons systems**.China has enjoyed a long-lasting monopoly on many of these resources for years, but the **recently discovered Japanese deposit could be mined cheaply without** any **environmental harm** and almost **doubles China’s reserve size**. This discovery carries many economic and political implications as well. **China** currently **supplies** **over 95% of** the **rare metals needed for high-tech industries** (think iPads, lasers, and plasma screens) **as well as military weapons systems** (avionics, satellites, and missiles.) In the 1990s, they flooded the market and undercut the value of these metals, forcing several international mining operations to shut down.**China[’s]** then cultivated **this monopoly**, and **the** rest of the **world** was happy to **let them** **destroy their environment** with the dirty, radioactive process of extracting the metals. The unfortunate catch, however, was that **companies were forced to move** their manufacturing operations **to Chinese soil – where** **their** technological **designs have** often **been stolen.In 2009, China** surprised the world by utilizing its monopoly to **restrict exports** and increase the price of rare earth metals. Most **countries were hostage** to their environmental policies, and couldn't restart their own mining operations. But **Japan’s** recent **discovery** **may force the Chinese to reduce prices** again, and in turn drastically drop retail prices in the tech industries. Amazon.com behaves in a similar fashion with companies it wants to acquire. If Amazon wants to buy you and you don’t want to sell, it will just flood the market with your products at a lower cost, and then buy your company when you can no longer compete. Japan’s recent discovery is the equivalent of a whole new Amazon site emerging on the precious metals scene overnight. If the U.S. really wanted to reopen their mining operations, they could subsidize a program *—* but it would be better to store our reserves of these critically strategic metals for another time, if we have that option. Rare earth metals are often found with thorium, and the process of removing them can produce a lot of radioactive waste. However, [thorium](http://www.ted.com/talks/kirk_sorensen_thorium_an_alternative_nuclear_fuel.html) has massive potential as a near limitless energy resource, especially in [molten salt reactors](http://www.technologyreview.com/news/512321/safer-nuclear-power-at-half-the-price/). These fuel cycle reactors would be an ideal place to dispose of thorium and provide vast quantities of energy for the country.

2. T/ Chinese environmental protection solves resource extraction conflict. Weston[[30]](#footnote-30) ‘06

**An**other **issue that could impact negatively on** positive **Sino-Japanese environmental collaboration is tensions** between both countries **over energy resources**. The unresolved issue of ownership of gas fields for example, **in the East China Sea** remains. However, that both nations recently set up guidelines to deal with the East China Sea problem is a positive mechanism for further dialogue and negotiations. Also high level talks about energy resources between both countries have been established. Finally, during President Hu Jintao’s visit to Japan both sides agreed to speed up talks regarding disputed gas fields in the East China Sea before the G‐8 summit. Although in June of 2008, China and Japan then agreed to joint development of the Shirakaba as well as another unnamed area in the East China Sea, there are still other disputed areas in the region. Moreover, this agreement still needs be formalized through a treaty. **Future Linkages** What are some of the future **linkages** or tradeoffs **for enhanced Sino-Japanese environmental cooperation**? As previously discussed, one important area is improved international standing. Another **is the generation of a positive atmosphere** or political will **for further dialogues**, **negotiations or different approaches**, for example, **concerning claims to East China Sea areas** ; the race for natural resources as well as historical issues. In line with this premise, Nippon Oil, the largest oil company in Japan, and the state owned China National Petroleum, China’s largest integrated oil and gas company, have recently signed an agreement for long term cooperation, including overseas oil and natural gas resources development. Enhanced **commitment by both governments to work on environmental issues** including energy **could serve as a platform to reach alternative conclusions regarding the East China Sea** area.

War goes nuclear. Goldstein[[31]](#footnote-31) ‘13

Much of the debate about China’s rise in recent years has focused on the potential dangers China could pose as an eventual peer competitor to the United States bent on challenging the existing international order. But another issue is far more pressing. For at least the next decade, while China remains relatively weak compared to the United States, there is a real danger that Beijing and Washington will find themselves in a crisis that could quickly escalate to military conflict. Unlike a long-term great-power strategic rivalry that might or might not develop down the road, the danger of a crisis involving the two nuclear-armed countries is a tangible, near-term concern -- and the events of the past few years suggest the risk might be increasing. Since the end of the Cold War, Beijing and Washington have managed to avoid perilous showdowns on several occasions: in 1995–96, when the United States responded to Chinese missile tests intended to warn Taiwanese voters about the danger of pushing for independence; in 1999, when U.S. warplanes accidentally bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade during the NATO air assault on Serbia; and in 2001, when a U.S. spy plane collided with a Chinese fighter jet, leading to the death of the Chinese pilot and Beijing’s detention of the U.S. plane and crew. But the lack of serious escalation during those episodes should not breed complacency. None of them met the definition of a genuine crisis: a confrontation that threatens vital interests on both sides and thus sharply increases the risk of war. If Beijing and Washington were to find themselves in that sort of showdown in the near future, they would both have strong incentives to resort to force. Moreover, the temptations and pressures to escalate would likely be highest in the early stages of the face-off, making it harder for diplomacy to prevent war THIN RED LINES It might seem that the prospects for a crisis of this sort in U.S.-Chinese relations have diminished in recent years as tensions over Taiwan have cooled, defusing the powder keg that has driven much Chinese and U.S. military planning in East Asia since the mid-1990s. But other potential **flash points have emerged.** As **China and its neighbors** **squabble over islands** and maritime rights **in the East** China **and South China seas, the U**nited **S**tates **has reiterated** its **treaty commitments to** defend two of the countries that are contesting China’s claims (**Japan and the Philippines**) and has nurtured increasingly close ties with a third (Vietnam). Moreover, **the Obama administration’s “pivot,”** or “rebalancing,” **to Asia**, a diplomatic turn matched by planned military redeployments, **has signaled** that **Washington is prepared to get involved in** the event of **a** regional **conflict**. Also, the United States insists that international law affords it freedom of navigation in international waters and airspace, defined as lying beyond a country’s 12-mile territorial limit. China, by contrast, asserts that other countries’ military vessels and aircraft are not free to enter its roughly 200-mile-wide “exclusive economic zone” without express permission -- a prohibition that, given Beijing’s territorial claims, could place much of the South China Sea and the airspace above it off-limits to U.S. military ships and planes. Disputes over freedom of navigation have already caused confrontations between China and the United States, and they remain a possible trigger for a serious crisis. It is true that **China and the U**nited **S**tates **are not currently adversaries** -- certainly not in the way that the Soviet Union and the United States were during the Cold War. **But** the **risk of a U.S.-Chinese crisis might** actually **be greater** than it would be if Beijing and Washington were locked in a zero-sum, life-and-death struggle. As armed adversaries on hair-trigger alert, **the Soviet Union and** the **U**nited **St**ates **understood** that **their** fundamentally opposed **interests might bring** **about** a **war**. After going through several nerve-racking confrontations over Berlin and Cuba, they gained an understanding of each other’s vital interests -- not to be challenged without risking a crisis -- and developed mechanisms to avoid escalation. China and the United States have yet to reach a similar shared understanding about vital interests or to develop reliable means for crisis management. **Neither China nor the U**nited **S**tates **has clearly defined** its **vital interests** across broad areas of the western Pacific. In recent years, China has issued various unofficial statements about its “core interests” that have sometimes gone beyond simply ensuring the territorial and political integrity of the mainland and its claim to sovereignty over Taiwan. Beijing has suggested, for example, that it might consider the disputed areas of the East China and South China seas to be core interests. Washington has also been vague about what it sees as its vital interests in the region. The United States hedges on the question of whether Taiwan falls under a U.S. security umbrella. And the United States’ stance on the maritime disputes involving China and its neighbors is somewhat confusing: **Washington has** remained neutral on the rival sovereignty claims and insisted that the disputes be resolved peacefully but has also **reaffirmed its commitment to stand by** **its allies in the event** that a **conflict erupts**. Such Chinese and U.S. ambiguity about the “redlines” that cannot be crossed without risking conflict increases the chances that either side could take steps that it believes are safe but that turn out to be unexpectedly provocative. MORE DANGEROUS THAN THE COLD WAR? **Uncertainty about what could lead** either **Beijing or Washington to risk war makes a** **crisis far more likely**, since **neither side knows** when, where, or just **how hard it can** **push without the other** side **pushing back**. This situation bears some resemblance to that of the early Cold War, when it took a number of serious crises for the two sides to feel each other out and learn the rules of the road. But today’s environment might be even more dangerous. The balance of nuclear and conventional military power between China and the United States, for example, is much more lopsided than the one that existed between the Soviet Union and the United States. Should Beijing and Washington find themselves in a conflict, **the huge U.S. advantage in conventional forces would increase the temptation for Washington to** threaten to or **actually use force**. Recognizing the temptation facing Washington, **Beijing might** in turn **feel pressure to use its conventional forces before they are destroyed**. Although China could not reverse the military imbalance, it might believe that quickly imposing high costs on the United States would be the best way to get it to back off. The fact that both sides have nuclear arsenals would help keep the situation in check, because both sides would want to avoid actions that would invite nuclear retaliation. Indeed, if only nuclear considerations mattered, U.S.-Chinese crises would be very stable and not worth worrying about too much. But the two sides’ **conventional forces** complicate matters and **undermine** the stability provided by **nuclear deterrence**. During a crisis, either side might believe that using its conventional forces would confer bargaining leverage, manipulating the other side’s fear of escalation through what the economist Thomas Schelling calls a “competition in risk-taking.” In a crisis, **China or the U**nited **S**tates **might believe** that **it valued what was at stake more than the other and** **would** therefore **be willing to tolerate** **a higher level of risk**. But because **using conventional forces would be** only **the first step in** an unpredictable process subject to misperception, missteps, and miscalculation, there is no guarantee that brinkmanship would end before it led to an **unanticipated nuclear catastrophe**. China, moreover, apparently believes that nuclear deterrence opens the door to the safe use of conventional force. Since both countries would fear a potential nuclear exchange, the Chinese seem to think that neither they nor the Americans would allow a military conflict to escalate too far. Soviet leaders, by contrast, indicated that they would use whatever military means were necessary if war came -- which is one reason why war never came. In addition, China’s official “no first use” nuclear policy, which guides the Chinese military’s preparation and training for conflict, might reinforce Beijing’s confidence that limited war with the United States would not mean courting nuclear escalation. As a result of its beliefs, Beijing might be less cautious about taking steps that would risk triggering a crisis. And if a crisis ensued, China might also be less cautious about firing the first shot. Such beliefs are particularly worrisome given recent **developments in tech**nology that **have** dramatically **improved the** precision and **effectiveness of conventional** military **capabilities. Their lethality might confer a dramatic advantage to the side that attacks first,** something that was generally not true of conventional military operations in the main European theater of U.S.-Soviet confrontation. Moreover, because the sophisticated computer and satellite systems that guide contemporary weapons are highly vulnerable to conventional military strikes or cyberattacks, today’s more precise weapons might be effective only if they are used before an adversary has struck or adopted countermeasures. If peacetime restraint were to give way to a search for advantage in a crisis, neither China nor the United States could be confident about the durability of the systems managing its advanced conventional weapons. Under such circumstances, both Beijing and Washington would have incentives to initiate an attack. China would feel particularly strong pressure, since its advanced conventional weapons are more fully dependent on vulnerable computer networks, fixed radar sites, and satellites. The effectiveness of U.S. advanced forces is less dependent on these most vulnerable systems. The advantage held by the United States, however, might increase its temptation to strike first, especially against China’s satellites, since it would be able to cope with Chinese retaliation in kind. COMMUNICATION BREAKDOWN A **U.S.-Chinese crisis might** also **be** more **dangerous** than Cold War showdowns **because** **of the unreliability of** the existing **channels of communication** between Beijing and Washington. After the Cuban missile crisis, the Soviet Union and the United States recognized the importance of direct communication between their top leaders and set up the Moscow–Washington hot line. In 1998, China and the United States also set up a hot line for direct communication between their presidents. But despite the hot line’s availability, the White House was not able to contact China’s top leaders in a timely fashion following the 1999 Belgrade embassy bombing or the 2001 spy-plane incident. China’s failure to use the hot line as intended might have reflected the reluctance of its leaders to respond until they had reached an internal consensus or until they had consulted widely with their military. The delay might also have reflected China’s difficulties in coordinating policy, since China lacks a dependable counterpart to the U.S. National Security Council. Whatever the reason, **experience suggests** that frustrating **delays in** direct **communication are likely during** what would be the crucial **early moments of** an unfolding U.S -Chinese **crisis**. Instead, communication between the two countries might initially be limited to either public statements or tacit signals sent through actions. But public statements are aimed at multiple audiences, and nationalist passions in either China or the United States, as well as pressure from allies, might force either side to take a more aggressive public stance than it actually felt was warranted. Absent direct and confidential communication, the two countries might be unable to discuss politically sensitive proposals. They might also be unable to share information that could help head off a disastrous escalation, such as classified details about military capabilities or military maneuvers already under way. Communicating through actions is also problematic, with many possibilities for distortion in sending messages and for misinterpretation in receiving them. Chinese analysts seem to overestimate how easy it is to send signals through military actions and underestimate the risks of escalation resulting from miscommunication. For example, the analysts Andrew Erickson and David Yang have drawn attention to Chinese military writings that propose using China’s antiship ballistic missile system, designed for targeting U.S. aircraft carriers, to convey Beijing’s resolve during a crisis. Some Chinese military thinkers have suggested that China could send a signal by firing warning shots intended to land near a moving U.S. aircraft carrier or even by carefully aiming strikes at the command tower of the U.S. carrier while sparing the rest of the vessel. But as the political scientist Owen Coté has noted, even a very accurate antiship ballistic missile system will inevitably have some margin of error. Consequently, even the smallest salvo of this kind would entail a risk of inadvertent serious damage and thus unintended escalation. A final important factor that could make a U.S.-Chinese crisis more dangerous than those during the Cold War is geography. The focus of Cold War confrontations was primarily on land, especially in central Europe, whereas a future confrontation between China and the United States would almost certainly begin at sea. This difference would shape a U.S.-Chinese crisis in a number of ways, especially by requiring both sides to make some fateful choices early on. China’s small fleet of nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and its much larger fleet of conventionally armed attack submarines are most secure when they remain in the shallow waters near the Chinese mainland, where poor acoustics compromise the effectiveness of U.S. undersea antisubmarine operations. Their proximity to Chinese land-based aircraft and air defenses also limits Washington’s ability to rely on its airpower and surface ships to counter them. For China’s submarine forces to play a role in a showdown with the United States, however, they would have to move out of those safer waters. The prospect of China’s submarines breaking out would dramatically increase the instability of a crisis. Although U.S. antisubmarine warfare technology would be more effective against China’s submarines operating in less noisy open waters (where the United States also enjoys air superiority), it would not be perfect: some U.S. naval assets that came within range of surviving Chinese submarines would be at risk. Early in a crisis, therefore, the United States would be tempted to minimize this risk by sinking Chinese attack submarines as they tried to leave their home waters. Especially because there are only a few narrow routes through which Chinese submarines can reach deeper waters, the United States would be tempted to strike early rather than accept an increased risk to U.S. naval forces. Regardless of the U.S. decision, any Chinese attack submarines that managed to reach distant deeper waters would face a “use them or lose them” dilemma, thanks to their greater vulnerability to U.S. antisubmarine forces -- one more potential trigger for escalation.China’s nuclear-armed SSBNs present other risks. Under its no-first-use policy, China has clearly stated that any attack on its strategic nuclear forces would justify nuclear retaliation, making a U.S. strike against its SSBNs seem unlikely. Early in a crisis, therefore, Beijing would probably believe that it could safely deploy its SSBNs to distant, deeper waters, where they would be best positioned to execute their launch orders. Such a deep-water deployment, however, would introduce new dangers. One is the possibility that **U.S. naval forces might mistake a Chinese SSBN for a conventional** attack **submarine and fire** on it, **inviting Chinese nuclear retaliation**. Another is the danger that a Chinese SSBN could escalate the conflict without explicit orders from Beijing, owing to the limited communication such submarines maintain with the mainland in order to avoid detection.

O/W (Short)

A. I control UQ- East Asia is on the brink of war. Nicholas and Page[[32]](#footnote-32) ‘13

Vice President [Joe **Biden**](http://topics.wsj.com/person/B/Joe-Biden/6352) **and** Chinese President Xi **Jinping ended** more than five hours of face-to-face **meetings** in Beijing **without resolving** the rising international **tensions** over China's declaration of a new air-defense zone, leaving questions over the next moves for each power and U.S. allies in the region.Mr. **Biden**, visiting Beijing on Wednesday, **pressed the point that the White House** "**doesn't recognize**" **the zone over the East China** **Sea** and wants China's leadership to avoid actions that could lead to confrontations with Japan and other nations, a U.S. official said.Mr. **Xi**, in turn, laid out China's position in the dispute, but **made no commitment to rolling back the zone**, U.S. officials said. Rather, he indicated he would "take on board" Mr. Biden's requests. A U.S. official, briefing reporters in Beijing after the meetings, said: "From our perspective, it's up to China. And we'll see how things unfold in the coming days and weeks." As part of his argument in favor of reducing tensions, Mr. Biden told Mr. Xi that China should adopt a series of measures to restore trust and confidence among neighbors in the region, including by establishing a system of emergency communications, or hot lines, that would rapidly connect officials from China and Japan, and possibly other countries. "The most urgent thing is, we want them to work with Japan and South Korea directly to do confidence-building measures," said a senior administration official. In an illustration of the fine points of superpower diplomacy, the U.S. didn't directly ask China to rescind the air-defense identification zone it established last month. And Washington didn't expect Mr. Xi to abolish the zone by the time Mr. Biden left for a scheduled stop Thursday in South Korea. "I don't think that folks had the impression the vice president would return from Asia and the defense zone would be gone," said Julianne Smith, a former national security aide to Mr. Biden. "What they wanted to do was to start a face-to-face conversation." Mr. Biden sought to rely on an element of personal diplomacy to end **a crisis** that **has rattled Japan and South Korea** **and** **created** a new point of **confrontation between the U.S. and China**. People close to Mr. Biden said he has forged a strong relationship with Mr. Xi over the years, and brought those ties to bear in meetings and at dinner Wednesday. But some analysts questioned whether Mr. Biden took the correct approach to a visit with such high stakes. "He did well according to normal diplomatic protocol, but this wasn't a normal diplomatic situation," said Michael Auslin, director of Japan Studies at the American Enterprise Institute. "Our allies were hoping for something much stronger, and I think they're probably going to feel that they're going to be on their own." In South Korea, Mr. Biden will try to persuade an old ally not to take actions that escalate the crisis.Seoul last week responded to China's air-defense zone by saying it was considering expanding its own air-defense zone, impinging not only on China's claims but on a zone previously declared by Japan. A formal announcement was delayed, probably until Mr. Biden completes his visit with President Park Geun-hye. South Korea also has a history of disagreements with Japan over territorial and historic differences, and experts saw the Chinese move last month as an opportunity for the U.S. to bring Tokyo and Seoul closer together. In light of Japan's feelings and Mr. Biden's visit, the South Koreans appeared to be moving cautiously. Mr. Biden's trip to the region came in the midst of an unexpected outbreak of animosity over the Chinese air-defense zone, put into place over islands that are the subject of a long-running dispute with Japan. The U.S. initially challenged the Chinese by flying B-52 bombers and other military aircraft through the zone without complying with requirements to notify Beijing. However, once in Beijing, Mr. Biden's first message to the Chinese leader was, "We've got to unwind this tension," the senior administration official said. As for the new air-defense zone, "We're not going to recognize it," the official said. "**The risk of escalation** here **is enormous**. And that's why we're so intensively addressing it." Neither leader mentioned the zone directly in their public comments, but people familiar with the talks said the two men discussed it during the course of two meetings and a dinner. In public remarks, Mr. Xi said that while bilateral ties were generally positive, the international landscape was undergoing "profound and complex changes," noting that "regional hot-spot issues keep cropping up." "The world, as a whole, is not tranquil," Mr. Xi said. "To strengthen cooperation and dialogue is the only right choice facing both our countries."Mr. Biden said the U.S. relationship with China was full of promise but needed to be "based on trust, and a positive notion about the motive of one another.On Thursday morning, Mr. Biden told executives of U.S. companies doing business in China that the country's new air zone had created "apprehension" in the region but that Beijing and Washington have an opportunity to establish "new rules for the road." He also praised China's efforts to reform its economy, and said, "As China's economy grows, its responsibility to ensure regional stability will grow." Japanese officials and security experts have expressed frustration by what they see as Washington's muddled response to China's aggression, a fear that has been exacerbated, rather than alleviated, so far during Mr. Biden's visit to Asia. "We are in a very difficult position," one Japanese government official said Thursday. Although Chinese, U.S. and Japanese military planes have likely not flown dangerously close to each other in China's zone, diplomats and analysts say, the danger lies in what happens if they narrow the gap, especially in the air over and for 12 nautical miles around the islands claimed by both China and Japan. So far, China has mostly sent marine surveillance planes toward the islands, but they have turned around before being intercepted by Japanese fighters, according to diplomats and Western analysts. **In a confrontation** between Chinese and Japanese fighters, **each side would likely** **be under orders to ignore warnings from the other, so the encounter could quickly escalate** into a contest of flying skills or even a shooting incident, analysts say. Japanese fighters could, in theory, also be backed up by U.S. fighter jets—most likely F-15s flying from Kadena Air Base in Okinawa—though **the U.S. would** likely **intervene** only in the most extreme circumstances.That is the least likely scenario as China has consistently avoided a direct military confrontation with forces it knows to be superior to its own, and which have trained together for several decades."If [Chinese fighters] engage in dogfights with Japanese fighters, they would almost certainly lose," said retired Lt. Gen. Kunio Orita of the Japan Air Self-Defense Force."Nobody wants to provoke a war. While this might be a change in name, in fact things will probably stay the same for the moment," said Ni Lexiong, a Shanghai-based Chinese military expert.**If China and Japan both enforce** their **claims around the islands**, then "firing flares and warning shots, or **shooting down** the other side's **planes**, **may not be far off**," Song Zhongping, a Chinese defense analyst, was quoted as saying in China News Weekly magazine. If tensions escalated, Chinese Su-30 and J-11 fighters would most likely fly from bases near Shanghai, military analysts say. Japan usually sends F-15s from Naha air base on the island of Okinawa to intercept Chinese planes that enter its zone. Response to Mr. Biden's visit in China was muted. An editorial in the Global Times, a nationalist-leaning tabloid published by the People's Daily, played down tensions over the air-defense zone and blamed Japan for "intentionally creating a crisis" in an effort to force confrontation between the U.S. and China. Chinese social media gave Mr. Biden a cooler reception than on his previous visit two years ago, when he charmed the online community by showing up at a family-run eatery to slurp down a bowl of lunchtime noodles. "When Biden doesn't have the heart to show off, that means we're right," wrote one user of the Twitter-like Sina Weibo microblogging service.  B. Probability 1. War likely over access to seaboard resources. Hsiung[[33]](#footnote-33) ’05 : Fourth, in the age of increasing resource scarcity, the **potential fo**r an **armed conflict increases when** known (or even suspected) **seabed resources are at stake**, **such as in the East** China Sea **and** the **South China Sea** as well.13 Given these circumstances, itbecomes instinctive for states to possess a Mahanian kind of naval supremacy, at leastover one’s territorial sea and EEZs, in order to secure their national interests. When **sea routes are** absolutely **essential for access to vital resources** (such as oil) from far-awaysources, a strategy that can be used against an opponent state is “sea denial,” athrow-back to the guerre de course of traditional times.14 **This is why the Chinese are** especially **jittery about a** presumed **threat of sea denial posed by Japan** to their access tothe sea. China has a coastline 18,000 kilometers (10,800 miles) in length, but its exits tothe sea run into the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of neighboring states, including thetwo Koreas and Japan. The latter is a geographic “opposite” state whose long coastline, interrupted by gaps, linking the islands of Japan proper with the Ryukyus (Okinawa), is parallel to the Chinese coastline. The **maritime territory claimed by Japan**, which in the Chinese view far exceeds what is allowed under the law of the sea (see below), **obstructs** the **Chinese access to the seabed oil/**gas **resources over** which Chinahas sovereignrights under the same law. Because Japan claims its EEZ extends to the disputed Diaoyutai, which is under 200 nautical miles from the Chinese coastline and is claimed by China, its sea-denial threat actually extends into China’s maritime territory. The only open entry left for mainland China to the high seas is through the Taiwan Strait. Even there, it has to be careful not to trespass into the other half of the Strait shared withTaiwan, as the latter remains outside PRC jurisdiction and claims a separate identity, with the support of Japan and the United States. 2. Alternate causality takes out the DA- the US is developing extraction facilities and accessing different metal supplies. Rowley[[34]](#footnote-34) ‘13Still, could **the Chinese monopoly could be coming to an end** through other means? The world has woken up to the importance or rare earths in recent years. **In California, a company** called Molycorp last year **resumed mining in the Mojave Desert,** after suspending work a decade earlier. With **new supplies having come online in** 2011 from a rival outfit, Mount Weld in **Australia,** prices for rare earths have been coming down in tandem with the whole commodity price spectrum. That is not being taken as reason to relax, however. There is currently no rare earth mining going on in the European Union, which relied 100pc on Chinese imports of rare earths in 2011, the most recent year for which data is available. **In the UK**, David **Cameron** in March **unveiled a bid to harvest the rare earths**, among other natural riches, that lie at the bottom of the ocean. Sponsored by the Government, a company called UK Seabed Resources has won the first commercial exploration rights over a 58,000 square–kilometre area of the Pacific,[**with the eventual aim of collecting mineral-rich polymetallic modules – mysterious formations on the ocean floor - which contain rare earths**](http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/commodities/9935942/Britain-plunges-into-deep-sea-mineral-rush-with-help-of-Howard-Hughes.html). That has yet to yield any product, of course, but signals the political interest in these materials. Similarly,[**Japanese scientists have found large reserves of rare earth metals on the Pacific seabed**](http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/ambroseevans_pritchard/9951299/Japan-breaks-Chinas-stranglehold-on-rare-metals-with-sea-mud-bonanza.html) that they say can be mined cheaply. As a result of growing production elsewhere, China’s share of the market dropped from 98pc to 86pc last year, according to figures from the US Geological Survey, as **new production came online in** Australia and **the USA**, supported by some small but stable production in India. And yet, even if China’s stranglehold on production of the raw elements is challenged, analysts warn that a more significant hold on the market remains unabated. The thing to remember is that China’s goal in offering state support to its home-grown rare earths industry was much broader than just digging and processing ore, says Kieron Hodgson, mining analyst at Charles Stanley. Beijing, instead, was aiming to build a value chain, where by the rare earths are dug up, processed, and then incorporated into end products. “China does not have a monopoly on the resource, it has a monopoly on the process,” he says. “It has world- leading processing facilities, world-leading ability to manufacture and take the product from the ground and put it into something of use - and that was always China’s ambition when it identified rare earths as strategic metals.” In this area, the West lags even further behind. It can also be argued that growth in production elsewhere could merely supportive of China’s prowess in this area, as it reaches the limits of its own production. As a result, he believes **Washington will eventually unleash state support** in a bid to foster an industry **to combat China’s dominance in this area.** “**The US** is likely to do something only because it **has enough resources to start an industry**," he says. “Governments are waking up to the fact that they almost have to bankroll it - in much the same way the Chinese government bankrolled it all those years ago.”  3. Greenstein 13 evidence- Japan-China conflict is much more likely because both airforces and navies are already patrolling the East China Sea, makes miscalculation and escalation unstoppable absent relaxing tensions. The US is treaty bound to defend Japan which forces US-China war, but the US can avoid war in the case China stops exporting.  C. Timeframe- the 1NC hegemony impact is just a linear disadvantage- the links don’t generate a brink or uniqueness for the impact scenario. The Barnett evidence talks about a gradual decline of US military primacy which will take years to materialize, but US-China happens in days.

## A2 Distribution CP

1. Perm- significantly limit extraction of natural resources and have the government distribute existent revenues- perm solves by engaging in distribution while protecting the environment- shields the link to the net benefit by creating a system to foster growth and legitimacy in the short run, but long enough to stabilize the country so limiting extraction has no impact

2. Perm- limit extraction and create or bolster the infrastructure required for revenue distribution- CP solvency evidence indicates transportation, communication, bank accounts are sufficient to foster political and economic stability- also proves no uniqueness on the net benefit- government can distribute other revenues- permutation is not intrinsic- this is a necessary plank of the CP, even if it’s implicit

3. CP can’t solve the aff and makes the problem worse- 6 independent warrants. Sandbu[[35]](#footnote-35) ’12 only summarizes arguments against the CP:

The objections to direct distribution come in three forms. The **first** concerns practical feasibility: **universal cash distributions** may **seem unrealistic in poor** (especially **war-torn**) **societies**. There are three answers to this objection:Direct distribution need not be complicated: it can be carried out through simple accounts held at rural post offices with check-cashing facilities; fraud can be prevented through the same techniques that are used to prevent double voting in elections.14 Naturally, **the system would** still **require a huge logistical effort**, but one that should be possible to overcome in all but the worst situations. (The initial establishment of the system would of course require adequate resources, and would likely have to be contracted out to an inter- national organization—perhaps to a private company with logistics expertise.) The **organization** required **for direct distribution is complementary to** other **infrastructural needs** in post-conflict settings—such as **a census, electoral rolls, and** basic **transportation and communication networks**. Since these needs have to be met in any case, the additional cost of implementing direct distribution is small. The take-up problem referred to earlier would probably be minimal, as the incentives for getting registered and obtaining the allotted cash would be huge. **second** category of objection is that even if **direct distribution** were fea- sible, it **would be politically impossible to implement**. If direct distribution will, in effect, force government to implement better policies than it otherwise would, why would political leaders want to establish a system that will reduce their room for maneuver or their ability to divert money for personal gain? This con- cern has been addressed in normal (nonconflict) situations with the following argument: although the problem is a serious one, it is important to acknowledge political circumstances that could encourage the adoption of direct distribution (Sandbu 2006): A state with newly discovered natural resource wealth, which has not yet been trapped by the political economy of the resource curse. The presence of political outsiders who can challenge entrenched elites and who may have an interest in a populist policy (which direct distribution no doubt is) as a means of shoring up popular support. • Moments of upheaval (such as wars or other sources of regime change), which present windows of opportunity during which institutional structure may be “up for grabs.”Upheaval is of particular relevance in post-conflict societies. The principal question is whether the open-ended situation that prevails for some time in the immediate aftermath of a conflict is particularly conducive to, or particularly likely to inhibit, the establishment of a direct distribution system. The answer depends, in part, on how the conflict ended—in particular, on whose support the new leaders rely. If the conflict did not culminate in a decisive victory for one side, direct distribution may be an attractive means of defusing distrust between power-sharing elites, precisely because it reduces the scope for foul play. But if one side completely dominates the post-conflict political landscape (especially if the war was between regionally or ethnically defined groups with little sense of common identity), this incentive is clearly missing. Nevertheless, even in this case, new leaders may see a need to win over the vanquished population, at least if they are not perceived by the vast majority as liberators who deserve a long honeymoon of unquestioned legitimacy (as could be the case, for example, for exiled leaders returning after the end of foreign occupation). When legitimacy is questioned, direct distribution may be an attractive way to obtain it; indeed, it could be justified in much the same way as patronage, with the crucial difference that it would cover the entire population.Even if new leaders do not need (or worse, do not care) to win over the population, the international community is likely to have its greatest influence on local politics in the year or two after a conflict ends. This is when the demand for donor funds is highest, especially in resource-rich states, where the conflict may have debilitated the state’s institutional and physical capacity to obtain or control the revenues from resource exploitation. It is therefore imaginable that a coalition of donors might require, as a condition for funds, the establishment of a direct distribution system once resource revenues start to flow. Donor governments could even channel their own aid wholly or partly through a direct distribution system, on the publicly declared understanding that within a few years, the country’s own government will replace donor funds with those from extractive resources. This approach would have a significant advantage: the establishment of the system would not have to depend on the weakened capacity of the war-torn state itself.None of this is intended to minimize the political challenges associated with getting direct distribution off the ground in a post-conflict environment. But the potential benefits of such a system make it worth the effort to identify opportuni- ties for making the attempt. Moreover, the political incentives for keeping the system in place once it is established are much less in doubt: once a population becomes accustomed to regular cash payments, it would be extremely politically costly to stop them. The example of Alaska, reviewed later in the chapter, bears this out.**final[ly]** category of concern is that **direct distribution will create perverse effects**. For example, an approach in which different resource **dividends** are **paid** to different regions or only to selected regions may not only create grievances, but **may** also **generate** a tremendous **incentive for migration, which can stir up tensions in** a **fragile post-conflict** environment. This concern justifies making direct distribution as universal as possible. Also in the category of potential perverse effects are new problems that may upset the equilibrium required for peace. For example**Recipients may waste** the **money on unproductive consumption**. **Direct distribution may lead to inflation** rather than to development. A system in which people receive **cash at regular intervals may encourage  criminality**, **such as extortion** by gangs on “payday.” The **distribution** system itself **may attract corrupt individuals**, just as normal  fiscal processes do when institutional controls are weak.

## A2 Whitman Form NC

1. “Developing countries” is not a life-form, no more than “fat man” is a life-form. The adjective appended to the subject “country” is not part of what is contained in the idea of a life-form. “Countries” is the form in question, and the fact that a country is developing could in fact just mean that that country is defective, by norms that are constitutive of being a country. This means NO RISK of offense off the NC – it just begs the question.

2. Their NC picks out an arbitrary empirical feature of countries, but doesn’t capture the essence of what it means to be a country. Just as having hands isn’t the constitutive norm that governs what it means to be a “good” or “bad” human (one can still be a human despite the not-having of hands), “developing” isn’t a constitutive norm of being a country. Developing is not part of the practice rules of being a country.

3. T/Countries are institutions, or practices, that are created by humans. Thus, the shared life form by bearers of the practice is the human life form, which is characterized by acting according to rational principle. The virtues are the means by which we achieve human flourishing, and it is virtuous to respect the environment. Hill writes:

## A2 Whitman Inner Freedom NC

1. Inner freedom is unintelligible without outer freedom. Saying agents determine their own wills is only meaningful because those wills are intentions for actions, and the security of action requires the agents outer freedom, or the ability

to select their ends and pursue the means to their ends. To say agents have inner freedom and that outer freedom is irrelevant is logically nonsense- agents must will the necessary means to their ends so the intention has to unconstrained by violations of outer freedom. This also means the neg can’t weigh links between the two conceptions of freedom- my argument is that the very idea of inner freedom is incoherent without outer freedom.

2. Her framework implies practical reason:

A. Inner freedom must be non arbitrary- the agents decisions must be based upon non arbitrary factors or else their decisions and actions wouldn’t be a reflection of the rational will, but rather randomness. Thus freedom has to be constrained by purely rational wills in order to be non arbitrary. This requirement form practical reason entails outer freedom.

B. Inner freedom requires a divorce from impluses, which is pure reason. Action is only rational expression if it is attributable to the agent. Korsgaard[[36]](#footnote-36):

Furthermore, in both arguments the identification of the metaphysical property is an attempt to capture a specific feature of action, an important thing that distinguishes an action from a mere event, namely, that**an action is *attributable* to the person who does it**. The metaphysical property Plato and Kant are looking for is the one that makes it true that the **action [doesn’t]** is not just something that **happens** in or **to the person but** rather **is something that** he as **a person *does.*** It is **the property that makes the *person* the author of the action.** Plato’s explicit use of the Constitutional Model makes it clear that he is trying to identify this property. For we certainly do distinguish the **[we distinguish] actions we attribute to a city** as such from the **[from] actions** we would **attribute only to** some of the **individuals in it.** And the basis of this distinction is whether the action was the outcome of following constitutional procedures or not. **If a Spartan attacks an Athenian,** for instance, we do not conclude that ***Sparta* is [not] making war on Athens unless the attack was** made **by a soldier acting under the direction of the rulers:** that is**, unless it issues from Sparta’s constitutional procedures**. By the analogy, **we** will only **attribute an action to a person, rather than** to **something in him, if it was directed by his reason, his ruling part**. In a similar way, Kant thinks that what makes an action attributable to the person is that it springs from the person’s autonomy or self-government. The ,

Implies a system of equal and outer freedom: Contained in the form of reasoning is that the agent must actually decide to pursue her end – otherwise her reasoning wouldn’t yield an action and thus would fail to be practical. It’s impossible to decide to pursue two contradictory ends. Then you’d decide that you both should do A and should not do A, but this would be no decision at all. Thus, you must will compatible ends in order to take any action at all. Willing compatible ends requires willing consistently with your own outer freedom, which is your independence from the choice of others. It’s logically incoherent to will a hindrance of your own outer freedom. This is because in willing *any end*, you hold yourself to be capable of bringing about the end, so you necessarily will that you be able to pursue it free from others’ choice.

3. It’s impossible for agents to be merely subjective willers.

A. To will an end is to will the agent be sufficient to bring about that end but that is impossible if every agent has subjective wills since other agents could prevent you from pursuing your ends. That justifies an omnilateral will- to will anything, the agent must be committed to the condition of pursuing the means to their ends- that is just a system of equal outer freedom.

B. Conflicts in subjective willing make morality incoherent- it’d be both right and wrong for a person to take an action from the persecptive of the willer. The only possible way inner freedom is normatively relevant is if their on constraints on action that follow from the will.

Contention:

1. Extracting resources is a violation of agents rights to freedom and wellbeing- it denies them ability to set ends and pursue the means to those ends. Rendall[[37]](#footnote-37)

**Intergenerational justice deals with our obligations to** past or **future generations**, particularly those with which our own lives do not overlap.  Certain actions – such as **cutting down forests or producing radioactive waste** – **let us make gains at our descendants’ expense**.  Tax cuts now, debt repayments later can be a winning formula for re-election, as recent U.S. history shows.  “In many intergenerational situations … it is less costly in the short term to ignore the problem,” observes Kimberly Wade-Benzoni.  “… In the long run, however, it ends up costing more – but those costs accrue to a different set of people.”  Intergenerational exploitation is particularly common in the environmental sphere.  Nuclear power raises many of the same distributive issues as nuclear deterrence.  We enjoy the electricity now; future generations face most of the risks. **We exploit our descendants by creating an externality in our favor, since “future generations must bear very significant costs without having received the benefits of the activities prior to the accident.”** So too with nuclear deterrence.  The objection that “no reasonable person with even a limited acquaintance with the history of human affairs over the last 3,000 years could be confident of safe storage by methods involving human intervention over the enormous time periods involved” applies at least as much to nuclear weapons as to nuclear waste.  Does any reasonable person, let alone a realist, expect deterrence to work for millennia without catastrophic “accidents”?

Thus agents in the future are denied their freedom, the ability to choose purposes, and well-being, or the abilities to realize purposes. Also outweighs neg offense- the violation is the worst because future generations are the most vulnerable. Agents in current generation are alive and have a chance of acting to ameliorate their situation and are thus include in willing the means to any end, whereas future generation don’t exist

2. Willing the destruction of finite, natural resources is incompatible with freedom. The institution of property is such that it provides one with the ability to employ usable things fully to achieve one’s purposes, so the destruction of property involves a contradiction in willing. Ataner[[38]](#footnote-38)

We can also make our point with a series of questions: **If “[f]reedom requires that you be able to have usable things fully at your disposal,** to use as you see fit, **and** so **to decide which purposes to pursue** with them”,131 **then is not the destruction of usable things in contradiction with the requirements of freedom? How are you supposed to pursue any further purposes if you have made it your purpose to destroy the things within which you pursue your purposes?** Clearly, given the Kantain perspective on the meaning of property, **the (permanent) destruction of finite, non-renewable natural resources, such as land, is incoherent: one simply cannot invoke the right of property, or the freedoms that it is supposed to enable, to justify destroying such resources.** Similarly, suppose Hegel is right to say that property permits the suppression of the “pure subjectivity of personality”, or that in possessing property I become “an actual will”, or that property “gives my will existence”, such that “not until he has property does the person exist as reason”. In that case, wouldn’t **the destruction of property result in a failed actualization of the will**? Suppose, again, we have a land-owner who wishes to poison his lands, rendering them unfit for future use: is such a person actualizing his will freely and effectively, or is he undercutting his own (future) ability to act freely and effectively? I maintain that, for both Kant and Hegel, the destruction of property holdings, especially of finite depletable resources, is fundamentally incompatible with the core rationale of property as a freedom-maximizing institution**.** Put differently, **the destructive,** dissipating or non-sustainable **use of finite,** depletable **natural resources,** especially land, **constitutes a transgression of freedom because such use is radically inconsistent with the conditions under which alone “the greatest use of freedom” is possible.** That is, Kant’s core tenet regarding the necessity of property acquisition as a function of our extended freedom in the world dictates that the character of usable things as usable, as means fit for the realization of human purposes, must be maintained in perpetuity.

3. Nature cannot be instrumentally valuable, so under the space of reasons it must be prioritized. To think nature operates in values mechanistically according to principles that are themselves valueless is non sense- the agent otherwise couldn’t explain why he shapes nature as s source of value to the agent himself. The implication is that nature cannot be outside the realm of value, but inside, so it must be prioritized.

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